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POLITICAL POWERLESSNESS
NICHOLAS O. STEPHANOPOULOS*
There is a hole at the heart of equal protection law. According to long-established
doctrine, one of the factors that determine whether a group is a suspect class is the
group’s political powerlessness. But neither courts nor scholars have reached any
kind of agreement as to the meaning of powerlessness. Instead, they have advanced
an array of conflicting conceptions: numerical size, access to the franchise, financial
resources, descriptive representation, and so on.
My primary goal in this Article, then, is to offer a definition of political powerlessness that makes theoretical sense. The definition I propose is this: A group is relatively powerless if its aggregate policy preferences are less likely to be enacted than
those of similarly sized and classified groups. I arrive at this definition in three
steps. First, the powerlessness doctrine stems from Carolene Products’s account of
“those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”
Second, “those political processes” refer to pluralism: the idea that society is
divided into countless overlapping groups, from whose shifting coalitions public
policy emerges. And third, pluralism implies a particular notion of group power—
one that (1) is continuous rather than binary, (2) spans all issues, (3) focuses on
policy enactment, and (4) controls for group size, and (5) type. These are precisely
the elements of my suggested definition.
But I aim not just to theorize but also to operationalize in this Article. In the last
few years, datasets have become available on groups’ policy preferences at the federal and state levels. Merging these datasets with information on policy outcomes, I
am able to quantify my conception of group power. I find that blacks, women, and
the poor are relatively powerless at both governmental levels; while whites, men,
and the non-poor wield more influence. These results both support and subvert the
current taxonomy of suspect classes.
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INTRODUCTION
A week into the 2010 trial over California’s Proposition 8 (which
banned same-sex marriage in the state), political scientist Gary Segura
took the stand for the plaintiffs.1 For the next two days, he testified
about gays’2 political power.3 It was quite low, in his view.4 Very few
openly gay individuals held elected office.5 Survey respondents felt
less warmth toward gays than toward almost any other group.6 Gays
were the most frequent victims of hate crimes.7 They also were the
1 See Transcript of Proceedings at 1523, Perry v. Schwartzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th
Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); see also Perry,
704 F. Supp. 2d at 937, 943, 945, 951–52 (discussing Segura and Kenneth Miller’s
testimony).
2 For the sake of brevity, I use “gay” throughout the Article as shorthand for “gay,
lesbian, bisexual, or transgender” and “homosexual.”
3 See Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 1, at 1523–881.
4 See id. at 1646 (“I conclude that gays and lesbians lack the sufficient power necessary
to protect themselves in the political system.”).
5 See id. at 1556–57 (noting that less than 1% of local, state, and federal officials have
been openly gay).
6 See id. at 1563 (observing that the average warmth score of 49.4 toward gays was
sixteen to twenty points lower than the average scores toward blacks and Hispanics).
7 See id. at 1880 (pointing out that gays are the victims of 70% or more of hateinspired murders).
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most frequent targets of hostile ballot initiatives, which succeeded
more than 70% of the time.8 And most states lacked any statutory
provisions protecting gays from discrimination.9
On the trial’s tenth day, another political scientist, Kenneth
Miller, took the stand for the defense.10 Miller also testified for two
days about gays’ political power.11 But, unlike Segura, he concluded
that it was substantial.12 Gays raised and spent large sums of money in
salient campaigns (like the one against Proposition 8).13 They enjoyed
access to powerful lawmakers.14 Their allies included Democratic
officeholders at all levels, organized labor, many corporations, and the
media.15 Candidates endorsed by gay rights groups prevailed at the
polls more often than not.16 And anti-discrimination laws, hate crime
penalties, and domestic partnership benefits existed in several states.17
Why did Segura and Miller focus so keenly on gays’ political
clout?18 The answer is that, under hornbook equal protection law, a
group’s political powerlessness is one of several factors that bear on
whether the group is a suspect class entitled to heightened judicial
protection.19 If gays are a suspect class, then laws that discriminate
against them, such as bans on same-sex marriage, are subject to more
rigorous scrutiny. But if gays are not a suspect class, then laws
targeting them must survive only rational basis review. Political
powerlessness matters because it helps determine suspect class status.
More importantly for present purposes, why did Segura and
Miller cite so many different conceptions of political influence—the
8 See id. at 1552 (stating that the success rate of anti-gay initiatives was close to 100%
in the marriage area and about 70% in other areas).
9 See id. at 1545 (noting that twenty-nine of the fifty states lack any anti-discrimination
provisions for gays).
10 See id. at 2414.
11 See id. at 2414–715.
12 See id. at 2480 (“I see sort of a trajectory of increasing success and power by the
LGBT-rights movement.”).
13 See id. at 2438 (observing that opponents of Proposition 8 raised and spent $43
million dollars).
14 See id. at 2448–53 (naming gays’ influential political allies).
15 See id. at 2455–68.
16 See id. at 2470–71 (reporting that fifty-nine of the sixty-two candidates endorsed by
Equality California won in the last election discussed by the organization’s website).
17 See id. at 2478–79 (pointing out that thirty states had adopted hate crime laws and
twenty-one had adopted laws protecting against employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation).
18 Impressively, more than 600 of the trial’s 3000 or so transcript pages were devoted to
the issue of gays’ political power. See Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 1.
19 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(explaining that one of the “traditional indicia of suspectness” is whether a group is
“relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process”).
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number of gays in office, feeling thermometer scores, hate crime statistics, money deployed in elections, alliances with other groups, the
fate of endorsed candidates, and so forth?20 The explanation is not
verbosity. Rather, it is the Supreme Court’s conflicting and atheoretical pronouncements about what it means by powerlessness. At different times, the Court has referred to a group’s numerical size, its
access to the franchise, its level of descriptive representation, its financial resources, and the enactment of policies protecting it, as the
essence of political strength.21 On none of these occasions has the
Court sketched any kind of theory that might explain why power
should be understood one way rather than another.22
Nor have scholars stepped into the breach. They have added candidates to the definitional mix—whether a group’s agenda is supported by public opinion, whether a group succeeds in repealing
adverse legislation, and whether a group is socioeconomically
advantaged, to name a few—but have failed to arrive at anything
resembling a consensus.23 They also have failed to provide much theoretical ballast for the powerlessness doctrine. The point that a group
can be deemed powerless only if we have an account of what power is
for equal protection purposes seems largely to have been missed.24
This conceptual confusion is both surprising and troubling. It is
surprising because, forty years after the factor was introduced,25 one
might expect courts and scholars to have worked out what powerlessness means and how it relates to democratic theory. And the trouble
with the current state of affairs is that it produces scenes like the one
in the Proposition 8 trial: rival experts testifying for days about what
power might or might not entail, neither having any reason to privilege any one definition over any other.26 This is no way for law to
operate. Litigants, judges, and academics alike need guidance in
determining how much influence a group enjoys—and so whether the
20

See supra notes 5–9, 13–17.
See infra Part I.A (showing that the lower courts have been even less consistent in
their analyses of powerlessness).
22 See infra Part I.A.
23 See infra Part I.B.
24 See infra Part I.B.
25 The Court’s first reference to political powerlessness came in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
26 Similar scenes unfolded in the proceedings in, among others, Equality Foundation of
Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 425–26 (S.D. Ohio 1994),
rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996), Evans v. Romer, 1993 WL
518586, at *11 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993), aff’d, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (en banc),
aff’d, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management, 881 F. Supp.
2d 294, 327–32 (D. Conn. 2012).
21
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case for extra judicial attention is bolstered or undercut. Without such
guidance, the hole at the heart of equal protection law will remain.
My first goal in this Article, then, is to offer a definition of political powerlessness that makes theoretical sense. The definition I recommend is as follows: A group is relatively powerless if its aggregate
policy preferences are less likely to be enacted than those of similarly
sized and classified groups. Where does this definition come from? A
multistage argument explains its provenance (and content).
First, the powerlessness factor stems from the third paragraph of
Carolene Products’s famous fourth footnote.27 In relevant part, this
paragraph states that “more searching judicial inquiry” may be
needed when the “operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities” is “curtail[ed].”28 It states, that
is, that heightened scrutiny may apply when a minority wields less
power than it would if the political system were functioning properly.
Second, the mechanism that typically is thought to protect minorities is, in a word, pluralism. If innumerable groups endlessly are
forming and breaking alliances as they jockey for advantage, then
each group sometimes will find itself in the majority. No group will be
a perennial loser if the winning coalition is reshuffled on each issue.
And third, pluralism does not always work as intended. Sometimes a group is unable to cut deals with its counterparts, and so ends
up being outvoted on item after item. It is precisely in this situation,
when a group loses unexpectedly often, that the group is relatively
powerless.
The pluralist roots of powerlessness account for each element of
my proposed definition. Why deem the enactment of preferred policies the crux of a group’s power? Because pluralism promises each
group a chance to win, not merely to play the game. Why consider
policies in the aggregate rather than individual issues? Because no
group in the pluralist competition is entitled to prevail on any particular matter. Why control for a group’s size when assessing its power?
Because size matters; all else being equal, a larger group is more likely
to end up in the majority. Why also control for classification type? To
avoid comparing apples (e.g., the political power of gays) to oranges
(e.g., that of blacks). And why conceive of powerlessness as a matter
of degree? For the sake of accuracy. Power waxes and wanes; it does
not turn on and off.
As soon as powerlessness is linked to pluralist theory, it becomes
clear why other definitions of the term are flawed. If policy enactment
27
28

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Id.
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is the essence of power, then a verdict of powerlessness cannot be
avoided simply because a group’s members are free to vote, are
affluent, or are descriptively represented (to name some prominent
alternatives). Participation, affluence, and representation undoubtedly
are correlated with policy enactment. But they are no guarantee of it,
and it is winning that matters under pluralism, not exhibiting some
common traits of winners. Similarly, the passage of measures protecting a group (such as anti-discrimination laws) is not proof that the
group is strong enough that judicial involvement is unnecessary. It
remains possible that the group loses on most other matters. Individual victories might conceal aggregate defeats.
In addition to defining powerlessness, I aim in this Article to
begin grappling with the fascinating conceptual, doctrinal, and institutional issues that it implicates. Several of these issues are meaty
enough to warrant papers of their own, so my discussion necessarily is
suggestive rather than dispositive. In the interest of space, I also flag
only three of the issues now, and leave the rest for later.
First, does it matter what the reason is for a group’s powerlessness? Carolene asserted that “prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities” is the principal cause of pluralist malfunction.29 But
scholars have subjected this claim to withering critique,30 while also
identifying many other factors that may account for a group’s lack of
influence: its diffuseness and anonymity, its low level of civic engagement, its dearth of resources, its support for a losing political party,
and so on.31 So what happens if a group is powerless but not for the
reason that Carolene envisioned? My tentative answer is that the case
for heightened scrutiny should remain intact. There still has been a
pluralist breakdown even if the breakdown is attributable to other
causes. Indeed, the powerlessness doctrine should be commended for
transcending Carolene’s “bad political science”32—for focusing on the
reality of malfunction rather than its explanation.
Second, is it possible to reconcile the inquiry into powerlessness
with the rest of equal protection law? The Court has made clear that it
subscribes to an anti-differentiation theory that subjects to more stringent review laws that distinguish among people on certain grounds.33
29

Id.
See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713
(1985) (arguing that discrete and insular minorities often have more clout than anonymous
and diffuse ones).
31 See infra Part II.C.1.
32 Ackerman, supra note 30, at 743.
33 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720
(2007) (“It is well established that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on
the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.”). I
30
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But powerlessness sounds not in anti-differentiation but rather in its
great rival, anti-subordination.34 To ask if a group lacks political influence is close to asking if the group is politically subordinated. In fact,
to talk of classes at all (instead of classifications) is to venture onto
thin legal ice. This tension is very real, and it may mean that the Court
someday will eliminate the powerlessness factor. For the time being,
though, the factor’s continued existence suggests that the Court’s
embrace of the anti-differentiation theory is incomplete. Apparently,
the Court cannot bring itself (as the theory would require) to excise
politics entirely from its equal protection analysis.
And third, are courts even capable of telling whether a group is
powerless? Under my definition, courts would need to assess the likelihood that a group’s aggregate policy preferences will be enacted,
controlling for the group’s size and type. Is this a feasible judicial
inquiry? Or, as Justice Powell once wrote about another of the factors
relevant to suspect status, a history of discrimination, is there “no
principled basis for deciding which groups would merit ‘heightened
judicial solicitude’ and which would not”?35 I think there is a principled basis for measuring groups’ political power, and my final goal in
this Article is to substantiate this claim empirically.
I try to do so, first, by surveying the existing political science literature. Scholars have found, for example, that blacks and Hispanics are
less likely than whites to have their preferences heeded with respect to
levels of federal spending.36 The voting records of members of
Congress also are less responsive to blacks’ and Hispanics’ views, even
taking group size into account.37 Both members of Congress and state
representatives are less responsive to the opinions of the poor as well,
again controlling for group size.38 The poor have less sway too over
federal and state policy outcomes.39 On the other hand, women are
almost as ideologically close to their House members as are men
(though gender proximity does vary by the member’s party).40 And
while there is little survey data on gays’ own preferences, it takes
call this theory “anti-differentiation” rather than “anti-discrimination” or “anticlassification” to avoid confusing it with anti-discrimination laws or suspect classifications.
34 The canonical work on the anti-subordination theory remains Owen M. Fiss, Groups
and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). See id. at 155 (arguing
that the Equal Protection Clause should be understood to protect “specially disadvantaged
groups” characterized by “perpetual subordination and circumscribed political power”).
35 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 296 (1978) (plurality opinion).
36 See infra Part III.A.
37 See infra Part III.A.
38 See infra Part III.D.
39 See infra Part III.D.
40 See infra Part III.B.
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more than majority support in the whole population before pro-gay
policies are likely to become law.41
Alas, while very interesting, most of the existing literature is deficient for my purposes. The problem is that little of it both examines
policy enactment and controls for group size. For instance, the work
on minority preferences and federal spending ignores the magnitude
of each minority group. So does the work on the adoption of pro-gay
policies, while also considering just a handful of items instead of the
entire issue universe. And all of the studies of legislators’ responsiveness and proximity to their constituents pertain to representation,
which has only a tenuous link to actual policy.42
I thought it necessary, then, to carry out my own empirical analysis to show that powerlessness is amenable to measurement. At the
federal level, I obtained access to a database recently compiled by
Martin Gilens that includes responses to more than 2000 survey questions over the 1981–2006 period, as well as information on whether
the policy asked about by each question was enacted during the
ensuing four years.43 Using this data, I replicated the models that
Gilens ran for different income groups, but for different races, genders, and religions. Controlling for group size, I found that whites’
preferences are more likely to be adopted by the national government
than racial minorities’; that men’s views are more impactful than
women’s; and that all religious denominations’ opinions are about
equally influential.44
At the state level, I used exit polls from 2000 to 2010, including
more than 300,000 respondents, to determine the average ideology of
different groups in each state.45 I also relied on an index of state policy
liberalism, spanning over 200 distinct issues, recently assembled by
Jason Sorens.46 These datasets enabled me to run essentially the same
models as at the federal level, only this time for a wider range of
41

See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.
43 See Economic Inequality and Political Representation, RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION,
http://www.russellsage.org/research/data/economic-inequality-and-political-representation
(last visited June 6, 2015). The book that Gilens wrote based on this data is one of a
handful of studies directly measuring powerlessness (as I define it). MARTIN GILENS,
AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN
AMERICA (2012).
44 See infra Part IV.A.
45 The Roper Center generously gave me access to its state exit poll archive. State
Election Day Exit Polls, ROPER CENTER, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/polls/uselections/state-exit-polls (last visited June 6, 2015) [hereinafter Exit Poll Database].
46 See Data, STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.
statepolicyindex.com/the-research/ (last visited May 23, 2015) [hereinafter Sorens
Database].
42
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groups thanks to the exit polls’ greater coverage. Controlling for
group size, I again found that state policy outcomes are more responsive to the preferences of whites and men than to those of racial
minorities and women.47 I also found that policy outcomes are more
responsive to the wealthy and the middle-class than to the poor, more
responsive to urban and suburban residents than to rural dwellers, and
about equally responsive to groups of different ages, educations, and
religions.48
These results are good evidence that powerlessness can be measured reliably. The consistency of the federal and state analyses,
despite the use of completely different data, is especially encouraging.
But the results are not just methodologically significant. They also
assist in answering the crucial substantive question of which groups
should be deemed suspect classes. The case for racial minorities and
women—groups already recognized by the Court49 —becomes
stronger given their meager influence on policy enactment. The case
against heightened protection for any age groups (also a result consistent with Court precedent)50 becomes more persuasive as well. But, at
least on grounds of clout, the poor have a compelling claim to suspect
status. Their policy preferences are less likely to be realized than those
of other income groups, at both the federal and state levels. The
Court’s holdings to the contrary51 are in tension with political reality.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I describe the conceptual confusion that mars the powerlessness doctrine. This confusion is
evident among both judges and academics, and stems from their
failure to connect the doctrine to its pluralist roots. In Part II, the
Article’s theoretical core, I offer a definition of powerlessness that is
derived explicitly from pluralist theory. I also criticize other definitions and begin coming to terms with the doctrine’s many intriguing
implications. In Part III, I examine the existing empirics on powerlessness. While there are several helpful studies, most of the literature
does not directly capture the concept. Finally, in Part IV, I conduct my
own empirical analysis of powerlessness. Using a series of recently
compiled datasets, I show that powerlessness indeed can be measured
and then usefully applied.
47

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
49 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (gender); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (race). However, as explained later, the case for blacks is substantially
stronger than that for Hispanics. See infra Part IV.C.
50 See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
51 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
48
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Two last introductory points: First, as important as what this
Article does is what it does not do. I do not provide an account of how
powerlessness relates to the ultimate determination of suspect class
status (though I note some possibilities). I also do not advance a general model of equal protection (though I do not hide my theoretical
preferences). My more modest aims are simply to define powerlessness sensibly and then to apply my definition empirically. These strike
me as quite enough for a single project.
And second, the powerlessness factor is not some dusty relic of
the New Deal or Warren Courts. Rather, its legal significance has
never been greater than it is today. Of all the cases ever to analyze it,
close to half have been decided since 2000.52 The majority of scholarship on the subject has been published in the same period.53 And perhaps the most common argument made by defendants in perhaps our
era’s highest-profile equal protection cases—those involving gay
rights—is that gays wield enough influence that courts need not intervene to protect them.54 There is some urgency, then, to the task of
figuring out what exactly powerlessness is, and who exactly counts as
powerless.55
I
CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION
The powerlessness doctrine has been around for a long time. Its
underlying theory was articulated in Carolene, decided in 1938,56 and
its explicit announcement came in the 1973 case of San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez. “[T]he traditional indicia of
suspectness,” declared the Court, include whether a group is “rele52 According to a Westlaw search conducted on January 15, 2015, 184 of the 501 federal
and state cases explicitly examining political powerlessness date from after 2000.
53 See infra Part I.B (discussing this scholarship).
54 See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 671 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussing defendants’
contention that gays are politically powerful and therefore same-sex marriage should be
left to the political process), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Pedersen v. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 329 (D. Conn. 2012) (same); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865,
882 (N.M. 2013) (“Focusing on the political powerlessness prong is a reasonable strategy
for the opponents of same-gender marriage . . . .”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is
Political Powerlessness a Requirement for Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 50
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9 (2010) (“The most popular strategy by defenders of ‘traditional
marriage’ . . . has been that gay people are not politically powerless . . . .”).
55 See Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class
Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 16),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571756 (“[T]he
controversy over the proper measure of political power is not likely to go away anytime
soon.”).
56 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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gated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”57
One might think that courts and scholars would have settled on
the meaning of powerlessness in the decades since Carolene and
Rodriguez. But one would be wrong. In fact, as I explain in this Part,
judges and academics have offered widely diverging definitions of
group influence, ranging from access to the franchise to descriptive
representation to the passage of protective legislation. What accounts
for this conceptual muddle? As to courts, I think the answer is their
tendency to analyze powerlessness in the abstract, without considering
the pluralist theory from which it arises. As to scholars, the most likely
explanation is their distraction by bigger game, such as whether there
should be a powerlessness factor in the first place.
A. Courts
Over the years, the Court or individual justices have advanced at
least five separate conceptions of powerlessness, all of which have
found adherents among the lower courts. I arrange these conceptions
here according to their stringency, beginning with the ones furthest
removed from actual policy enactment. I also focus on the Court’s
reasoning and consign most of the lower courts’ analyses to the
margins.
First, certain Justices have equated a group’s political strength
with its numerical size. In a 1989 case, Justice Marshall argued that the
“numerical . . . supremacy of a given racial group is a factor bearing
upon the level of scrutiny to be applied,”58 while in a 1996 case, Justice
Scalia contended that women cannot be powerless “when they constitute a majority of the electorate.”59 Several lower courts have echoed
57 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). The other
traditional indicia of suspectness are (1) whether a group has experienced a history of
discrimination; (2) whether a group is defined by an immutable characteristic; and (3)
whether a group is defined by a trait that typically bears no relation to the group’s ability
to contribute to society. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. Of course, it is quite
ironic that the powerlessness doctrine was announced in a decision that was so hostile to its
use to provide heightened protection to the poor. The doctrine’s roots also stretch all the
way back to Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879) (noting that African
Americans “need[ ] the protection which a wise government extends to those who are
unable to protect themselves”). But even if concerns about powerlessness animated some
of the pre-Rodriguez cases granting suspect status to different groups, these concerns were
not voiced openly and so are difficult to analyze.
58 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 553 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (referring to blacks in Richmond, Virginia).
59 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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these views in gay rights cases, claiming that gays lack influence
because they “make up only a small percentage of the population.”60
Second, in its cases conferring suspect status to aliens, the Court
has treated the right to vote as the linchpin of political power. Aliens
allegedly are powerless because they “are not entitled to vote,”61
“have no direct voice in the political processes,”62 and are “formally
and completely barred from participating in the process of self-government.”63 Following the Court’s lead, a few lower courts have
emphasized access to the franchise in cases involving juveniles64 and
the poor.65
Third, in a 1973 decision suggesting that gender classifications
might be subject to strict scrutiny, a plurality of the Justices defined
power in terms of descriptive representation.66 Women lacked clout
because they were “vastly underrepresented in this Nation’s decisionmaking councils . . . throughout all levels of our State and Federal
Government.”67 Several lower courts’ discussions of gays’ influence
have proceeded along similar lines. Typically, these courts have concluded that gays are powerless due to the “underrepresentation of
gays and lesbians in political office.”68 On one occasion, though, a fed60 Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1014 (W.D. Wisc. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Baskin
v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); see also, e.g.,
Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 546 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (noting that the inquiry into
powerlessness might look to the size of the class), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772
F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015);
Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 960 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (“[G]ays and lesbians
constitute a minority that lacks significant political power.”).
61 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976).
62 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978).
63 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Minors cannot vote and thus
might be considered politically powerless to an extreme degree.”).
64 See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that juveniles
“lack the right to vote” and have no “independent voice in legislative decisionmaking”).
65 See Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1022 & n.19 (Colo. 1982)
(contrasting the poor, who are free to vote, with situations in which “a racial minority
group was effectively excluded from equal participation in the political process”).
66 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973) (plurality opinion).
67 Id.; see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 514 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(arguing against Mexican-American powerlessness in a county where “a majority of the
elected officials . . . were Mexican-American, as were a majority of the judges”).
68 Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989 (S.D. Ohio 2013), rev’d sub nom.
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also, e.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 727 (9th Cir. 1989)
(en banc) (Norris, J., concurring in the judgment); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407, 446 (Conn. 2008) (“[O]f the more than one-half million people who hold a
political office at the local, state and national level, only about 300 are openly gay
persons.”); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 882 (N.M. 2013).
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eral court of appeals determined that “[h]omosexuals are not without
political power” based on a story that “one congressman is an avowed
homosexual, and that there is a charge that five other top officials are
known to be homosexual.”69
Fourth, in a 1996 case, Justice Scalia asserted that affluence is the
essence of influence.70 Because gays “have high disposable income,”
“they possess political power much greater than their numbers, both
locally and statewide.”71 At least one lower court has taken a similar
approach, though it deemed gays a suspect class after finding that
“homosexuals earn an income roughly equal to that of the national
average.”72
And fifth, in the 1985 case that prompted the Court’s most
extended commentary on powerlessness, it stressed the enactment of
protective legislation.73 “[T]he legislative response” to the condition
of the mentally handicapped, which includes a range of beneficial federal laws, “negates any claim that [they] are politically powerless in
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the
lawmakers.”74 Some lower courts have seized on this language to deny
gays’ claims to suspect status. They have reasoned that gays indeed
are able to attract lawmakers’ attention, as evidenced by the pro-gay
measures that certain jurisdictions have adopted.75 Other courts have
paid heed not just to gays’ victories but also to their defeats. They
usually have determined that the losses outnumber the wins, meaning
that a judgment of powerlessness is warranted.76 And still other courts
69 Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added) (citing
Margaret Carlson, Getting Nasty: How to Spread a Smear, TIME, June 19, 1989, at 33); see
also Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1008 (D. Nev. 2012) (concluding that gays are
not powerless after observing that “[h]omosexuals serve openly in federal and state
political offices”), rev’d sub nom. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014).
70 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645–46 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting gays’
geographic concentration and greater preference intensity on gay rights issues).
71 Id.
72 Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 438
(S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
73 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 444–45 (1985).
74 Id.; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[A] long list of legislation proves the proposition [that women are powerless] false.”);
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (citing the “solicitous regard that
Congress has manifested for conscientious objectors” as a reason not to deem them
powerless (internal quotation marks omitted)).
75 See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th
Cir. 1990); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 611 (Md. 2007) (noting gays’ “growing
successes in the legislative and executive branches of government”); Andersen v. King
Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 974–75 (Wash. 2006) (citing the “enactment of provisions providing
increased protections to gay and lesbian individuals”).
76 See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 988 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (noting that a majority of states passed constitutional amendments banning same-sex
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have broadened the inquiry and asked whether gays are able to end
discrimination against them through the political process. Their
answer most often has been negative, leading to their conclusion that
gays lack influence.77
The crucial point about these definitions is that they are entirely
inconsistent with one another. Gays may be a small and underrepresented minority frequently targeted by hostile legislation
(implying powerlessness), but they also vote freely, enjoy reasonable
affluence, and win some policy battles (implying power). Similarly,
blacks seem weak if their population share and income are emphasized, but quite potent if the spotlight shifts to their access to the
franchise, descriptive representation, and success in passing anti-discrimination and affirmative action laws. Grappling with these difficulties, lower courts often have complained that “the Supreme Court has
no more than made passing reference to the ‘political power’ factor
without ever actually analyzing it,”78 and that “the Court has never
defined what it means to be politically powerless.”79 Scholars have
bemoaned the absence of doctrinal clarity in similar terms.80
What explains this confusion? Why have courts not settled on a
single conception of group influence? The most likely answer, in my
view, is the tendency of judges steeped in the common law system to
marriage); Equal. Found., 860 F. Supp. at 439 (observing that gay “victories are being
‘rolled back’ at an unprecedented rate and in an unprecedented manner”); Jantz v. Muci,
759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan. 1991) (criticizing the position that “scattered, piecemeal
successes in local legislation are proof of political power”), rev’d, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir.
1992).
77 See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The question is
not whether homosexuals have achieved political successes over the years; they clearly
have. The question is whether they have the strength to politically protect themselves from
wrongful discrimination.”), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 444 (Conn. 2008) (finding that gays lack political power because of
their inability to rectify discrimination through the political process); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862, 894 (Iowa 2009) (same). For a longer discussion of how lower courts have
dealt with the passage of some pro-gay policies, see Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar:
Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV.
1363, 1381–90 (2011).
78 Equal. Found., 860 F. Supp. at 437 n.17.
79 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 893; see also, e.g., Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F.
Supp. 2d 294, 328 (D. Conn. 2012) (commenting on the “ill-defined nature of this factor”);
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 441.
80 See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Not Without Political Power”: Gays and
Lesbians, Equal Protection and the Suspect Class Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. 975, 979 (2014)
(describing powerlessness as “perhaps the most undertheorized element of the suspect
class doctrine”); Schacter, supra note 77, at 1392 n.192 (referring to the “Supreme Court’s
pronouncements” on powerlessness as “scattered, scant and inconsistent”); Kenji Yoshino,
Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 1753, 1793 (1996) (“[C]ourts have struggled to determine the appropriate indicia of
political powerlessness.”).
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apply doctrinal tests without reflecting much on their origins. Take the
Connecticut Supreme Court, whose 2008 disquisition on powerlessness remains the most detailed and thoughtful of any judicial body.81
The court began by noting that powerlessness need not be absolute
since blacks and women, both suspect classes, have at least some political clout.82 The court then announced its definition of powerlessness:
“whether the group lacks sufficient political strength to bring a
prompt end to the prejudice and discrimination through traditional
political means.”83 Next, the court recited several factors that convinced it that gays lack such strength: the intensity of the hostility
against them, the scarcity of openly gay legislators, the limits of the
protective measures already on the books, and so on.84 Finally, the
court argued that whatever influence gays wield, it is less than that of
blacks and women, meaning that they too must be deemed
powerless.85
Entirely missing from this analysis was any consideration of why
the powerlessness doctrine exists in the first place. The court did not
connect the doctrine to Carolene.86 Nor did it mention the pluralist
theory that offers at least one solution to the puzzle of how much
influence minorities should wield in a democracy. Nor did it cite the
political process approach associated most closely with John Hart
Ely.87 Instead, the court treated the words political powerlessness as if
they were written in a vacuum, devoid of any theoretical foundation,
open to whatever interpretation judges might give to them. It is no
surprise that this mode of reasoning, repeated by many courts over
many cases,88 gives rise to irreconcilable notions of power. Power is a
coherent concept only if it is perceived through a theoretical prism.
81 See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 440–61; see also Schacter, supra note 77, at 1383
(describing Kerrigan’s analysis as “the most developed and extended”). As I discuss below,
Schacter’s explanation for the doctrinal confusion is different from mine. See infra
Conclusion. She thinks political process theory itself is to blame. See Schacter, supra note
77, at 1390–402.
82 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 440–44.
83 Id. at 444.
84 Id. at 444–52.
85 Id. at 452–54.
86 The court cited Carolene only for the proposition that “discrete and insular”
minorities might require heightened judicial protection. Id. at 439.
87 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (setting forth the
approach in detail).
88 Very few court decisions have approached powerlessness from a more theoretical
perspective. See, e.g., Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F.
Supp. 417, 437–39 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (discussing pluralist theory), rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th
Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 349
(D.C. App. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Finally, there is
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This critique of the Connecticut Supreme Court applies even
more strongly to the U.S. Supreme Court. In the half dozen or so
cases in which the Court has examined the powerlessness factor
explicitly, it never has linked it to any kind of democratic theory.
Instead, the Court has tended to quote the factor’s language, to
invoke one or another conception of influence—and then to move
quickly to other matters.89 It is true that the Court, as the ultimate
expositor of equal protection law, might have reasons beyond
common law instinct for declining to define powerlessness more
clearly. It might worry that a crisper definition (indeed, any definition
at all) would push the law in unwanted directions. I address the potentially unsettling implications of the powerlessness doctrine later in the
Article.90 But next, I turn to the academic literature to see if scholars
have done a better job than courts in ascertaining what the doctrine
means.
B. Scholars
The short answer is no. In their works on powerlessness, scholars
mostly have reiterated the standards already set forth by courts. While
they have tweaked the judicial tests in various ways, they have not
come to any consensus on the meaning of group influence. In fact,
almost exactly the same cleavages that appear in the doctrine are evident in the relevant scholarship as well.
Take a group’s numerical size (the first of the judicial definitions).
Owen Fiss has argued that blacks are powerless because “they are a
numerical minority,”91 while Michael Klarman has advocated the
opposite conclusion for women because they are a “slight majority of
the eligible voting population.”92 Or consider a group’s access to the
franchise (the second judicial definition). William Eskridge has contended that after “people of color started voting” and “women gained
the question drawn directly from Carolene Products: whether gays and lesbians are a
politically powerless minority.”).
89 See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 637–38 (1986); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982);
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361,
375 n.14 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973) (plurality opinion);
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
90 See infra Part II.C.
91 Fiss, supra note 34, at 152 (citing blacks’ economic condition and prejudice against
them).
92 Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L.
REV. 747, 751 (1991) (noting that women are “fully enfranchised”).
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formal access to the political process,” “it was not clear what more a
referee Court should do.”93
Likewise, a group’s descriptive representation (the third definition) takes pride of place in the work of Daniel Farber and Philip
Frickey94 and Suzanna Sherry.95 Sherry has written that “heightened
scrutiny would be appropriate” if “a discriminatory decision is made
by a political body in which [a group is] underrepresented.”96 A
group’s socioeconomic status (the fourth definition) is the core of
Kenji Yoshino’s conception of influence.97 Three of his “factors [that]
can influence a group’s political power” are “the group’s income and
wealth,” “its education level,” and “its social position.”98 And the passage of protective legislation (the fifth definition) is endorsed by
Eskridge in another piece99 as well as by Marcy Strauss.100 Strauss has
put the point nicely: “Political powerlessness refers to a group’s
inability to rely on the legislative process to protect its interests.”101
Scholars, then, are just as conflicted as courts on the meaning of
powerlessness. How come? As before, I think one explanation is the
temptation (not limited to judges) to focus on doctrine at the expense
of theory. Several of the relevant articles dive into definitional issues
without pausing to consider what broader values the powerlessness
93 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2379, 2381 (2002).
94 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on
Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 685,
705 (1991) (commenting that “[a]lthough political influence is virtually impossible to
measure, political representation is not”).
95 See Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context:
Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. L.J. 89, 123 (1984).
96 Id.
97 See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility
Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 565 (1998).
98 Id. (recommending a group’s “health and longevity,” “its freedom from public and
private violence,” “its ability to exercise its political rights,” and “the acceptability of
prejudice against the group”).
99 See Eskridge, supra note 54, at 5 (describing political power as a group’s ability to
“resist or repeal these unjust discriminatory laws”).
100 See Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135,
153 (2011).
101 Id. Still more conceptions of powerlessness abound. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 87, at
152 (arguing that blacks are not powerless because they supported the winning presidential
candidate in 1976); Hutchinson, supra note 80, at 1003–04, 1028 (offering a definition
centered on whether public opinion favors a group’s agenda); Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a
Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721, 734 (1991)
(claiming that a group has sufficient power when the legislature “address[es] a group’s
concerns appropriately”). And in a valuable recent addition to the powerlessness
literature, Ross and Li have advocated a “more holistic approach to determining whether a
group has political power” that encompasses all of the factors previously identified by
courts. Ross & Li, supra note 55 (manuscript at 5).
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factor might aim to realize.102 Another reason probably is academic
self-interest. A scholar makes few waves by agreeing with existing
positions. Professional incentives encourage differentiation.103
But the most likely answer, in my view, is simply that the literature has focused on tasks other than defining group influence. In particular, most scholars have sought either to assess the normative
desirability of the powerlessness factor, to explain why certain groups
but not others are deemed powerless, or to examine how the factor
relates to the other suspect class criteria. Eskridge104 and Jane
Schacter,105 for instance, have argued that powerlessness should be
eliminated as an independent criterion for suspect status. Similarly,
Eskridge,106 Schacter,107 and Yoshino108 have observed a paradox in
which courts dub powerful groups as powerless and powerless groups
as powerful. And Richard Levy,109 Daniel Ortiz,110 and Yoshino111
have stressed the oddity of employing some factors that reflect antidifferentiation theory and others that sound in anti-subordination. It
is unfortunate, but not entirely unexpected, that a consistent conception of powerlessness has failed to emerge from such diverse academic
projects.
Ultimately, the reasons for courts’ and scholars’ confusion are not
terribly important. The key points are that there is sharp disagreement
over the meaning of powerlessness—and that the disagreement mat102 See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 80, at 1028 (proposing a definition based only on
various factors that political scientists have measured); Strauss, supra note 100, at 153
(proposing a definition without any prelude at all). For a notable exception, see Schacter,
supra note 77 (discussing the operation of a system that properly represents minority
interests).
103 I am aware that this point applies to this Article, too.
104 See Eskridge, supra note 54, at 20 (“[P]olitical powerlessness should not be a
requirement for strict scrutiny.”).
105 See Schacter, supra note 77, at 1403 (“[T]he powerlessness criterion might be better
conceptualized as something to be assessed . . . as an aspect of past discrimination . . . .”).
106 See Eskridge, supra note 54, at 19 (arguing that minority groups must pass a
threshold of political power before the Court will apply heightened scrutiny).
107 See Schacter, supra note 77, at 1397–402 (arguing that courts will apply protections
to minority groups only after public opinion has deemed them worthy of protection).
108 See Kenji Yoshino, The Paradox of Political Power: Same-Sex Marriage and the
Supreme Court, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 527, 541 (2012) (“A group must have an immense
amount of political power before it will be deemed politically powerless by the Court.”).
109 See Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Rationales in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 45 (2010)
(discussing the Court’s “political process” and “individual fairness” rationales in its
jurisprudence on suspectness).
110 See Ortiz, supra note 101, at 732 (“[T]he Court’s overall approach to identifying
suspect and quasi-suspect classifications appears highly schizophrenic.”).
111 See Yoshino, supra note 97, at 563–64 (observing that some factors are class-based
while others are classification-based).
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ters because it makes it almost impossible to tell whether a group does
or does not qualify as powerless. In the next Part, I try my hand at
clearing the fog that shrouds this area of law. I try, that is, to offer a
definition of powerlessness that makes theoretical sense, and to show
that other definitions are theoretically lacking.
II
PLURALISM

AND

POWER

The definition I propose is this: A group is relatively powerless if
its aggregate policy preferences are less likely to be enacted than those
of similarly sized and classified groups. I explain, first, how this definition stems from the pluralist theory that underpins Carolene. The
theory claims that, in a properly functioning political system, groups
of about the same size and type should have about the same odds of
getting their preferred policies enacted. So if a group’s odds actually
are much lower than its peers’, then the system is not working properly, and the group is relatively powerless.
I then contend that other definitions of powerlessness are deficient from a pluralist perspective. The trouble with numerical size,
access to the franchise, descriptive representation, and socioeconomic
status is the same: None of these options zeroes in on policy enactment itself (as opposed to one of its potential causes). The passage of
protective legislation comes closer to the mark. But the approach still
is flawed because it considers only a small subset of all the issues that
make up the pluralist marketplace.
Lastly, I begin exploring the many fascinating implications of the
powerlessness doctrine. As to powerlessness itself, I discuss whether
the reasons for it matter (I think not), and whether influence can vary
over time and space (absolutely). As to the doctrine’s legal fit, I
address its relationship to the other suspect class criteria (awkward),
its relationship to equal protection law as a whole (also uneasy), and
the status of the pluralist theory on which it rests (questionable). And
as to the courts that are responsible for implementing the doctrine, I
comment on their capacity to do so given their political and psychological constraints (comparatively high), and their ability to determine
powerlessness in the first place (improving).
A. From Theory to Meaning
The case for my proposed definition of powerlessness has several
steps. Below, I go through these steps and then show how each element of the definition follows from pluralist theory.
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1. Pluralist Hopes and Fears
The first key point about the powerlessness factor is that it is
derived explicitly from the third paragraph of Carolene’s legendary
fourth footnote. If “those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities” are “curtail[ed],” then minorities have less
influence than they would if the “processes” were operating properly.112 They are relatively powerless compared to the “ordinar[y]” situation in which their interests are “protect[ed].”113 This linkage
occasionally has caught the Supreme Court’s eye.114 It also has been
recognized by several scholars. Yoshino, for example, has observed
that “[t]he conventional wisdom that courts should not protect groups
with sufficient political power dates back [to Carolene].”115
Second, the mechanism that typically is thought to protect minorities is, in short, pluralism. The Court, atheoretical as ever, has never
said so outright.116 But pluralism is one of the great theories of
American democracy,117 and it was especially ascendant when
Carolene was decided in the 1930s. As political scientists Frank
Baumgartner and Beth Leech have written, the approach was “the
central framework of analysis during the first sixty years of [the twentieth] century.”118 Because of this intellectual dominance—and
because it is hard to come up with other democratic theories in which
112

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Id.
114 See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 (1982) (discussing
Carolene and the role of the judiciary in safeguarding the interests of the politically
powerless); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (connecting
concern “for a discrete class’s political powerlessness” to “the moment the Court began
constructing modern equal protection doctrine in [Carolene]”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
216 n.14 (1982) (citing Carolene to support the assertion that powerless groups require
judicial protection from the political process).
115 Yoshino, supra note 108, at 537; see also, e.g., EVAN GERSTMANN, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED
EQUAL PROTECTION 80 (1999) (noting that the powerlessness factor “flows logically from
the Carolene Products rationale for suspect classes”); Levy, supra note 109, at 38
(describing Carolene as the source of political process failure theory).
116 Though lower courts occasionally have. See, e.g., Equal. Found. of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 438 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (“All groups
are a minority on specific issues, and thus all groups must form coalitions in order to obtain
beneficial legislation.”), rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
117 See BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM
QUANDARY 12 (2014) (referring to pluralism as one of “three major reform traditions in
the United States”).
118 FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE IMPORTANCE
OF GROUPS IN POLITICS AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 48 (1998); see also, e.g., E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 21 (1960) (describing the ascendance of “‘group’ theories of politics” during the
“first third of the twentieth century”); Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed
Distrust: Equal Protection and the Evolving Judicial Protection of Politics, 101 CALIF. L.
113
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minorities play a central role—there is little academic disagreement
that Carolene’s “political processes” refer to pluralism. In Edwin
Baker’s words, “[t]he image of the democratic process that is most
consistent with [Carolene’s] footnote . . . is pluralistic democratic
theory[ ].”119
Third, while there exist several variants of pluralism,120 all of
them share the following core logic: The population is divided into
innumerable groups, none amounting to a majority, by myriad crosscutting and overlapping cleavages.121 Public policy emerges as these
groups continuously compete and bargain with one another to
advance their respective interests.122 The makeup of the winning coalition shifts from issue to issue as the groups recurrently form and
break alliances.123 It thus is impossible to speak of “majority rule”
since there is no single majority that remains constant across areas and
over time.124 Instead, public policy is the product of “minorities
REV. 1565, 1610 (2013) (describing pluralism as the dominant theoretical conception of
politics prior to 1960).
119 C. Edwin Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal
Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1036 (1980); see also, e.g., ELY, supra note 87, at 80
(claiming even more broadly that the entire “Constitution’s more pervasive strategy . . .
can be loosely styled a strategy of pluralism”); Ackerman, supra note 30, at 719
(“[G]enerations of [scholars] have filled in the picture of pluralist democracy presupposed
by Carolene’s distinctive argument for minority rights.”).
Of course, there are other plausible readings of Carolene (especially its second
paragraph) as well. My claim is only that the pluralistic reading is a common and intuitive
one.
120 See, e.g., John F. Manley, Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and
Pluralism II, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 368, 368–69 (1983) (contrasting conventional
“pluralism I” with more pessimistic “pluralism II”).
121 See, e.g., ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 207 (1967) (noting
that “we get a great confusion of the groups” when “hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
planes [representing cleavages] are passed through the sphere [representing the public]”);
ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 369 (1967); DAVID B.
TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 508
(1951) (discussing the importance of overlapping group membership and changing interest
groups in the political arena).
122 See, e.g., BENTLEY, supra note 121, at 260 (describing government as the process of
aligning sets of interest groups); V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE
GROUPS 149 (5th ed. 1964) (“Much public policy emerges from . . . friction, attrition, and
agreement among groups.”); Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory,
46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 376, 390 (1952).
123 See, e.g., NELSON W. POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY 115
(1963) (describing the pluralist assumption that winning political coalitions will differ
across issues and in levels of intensity); Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 737 (1983) (“In the absence of a majority preference cluster,
political outcomes are brought about by shifting coalitions of smaller clusters.”); Ross,
supra note 118, at 1580.
124 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 128 (1956).
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rule”—the particular combination of groups that manages to prevail
on a given matter.125
Fourth, minorities usually are protected in a pluralist system
because they usually have decent odds of getting (at least some of)
their preferred policies enacted. True, there is no guarantee that any
group will end up on the winning side of any individual dispute.126
But, as alliances endlessly come together and then come undone, any
group that is willing to engage in “wheeling and dealing,” in Ely’s
phrase, sometimes should find itself in the majority.127 Why? In part
because of sheer chance; in a world of ever-changing issues and cleavages, no group should be a perennial winner or loser.128 But also
because each group controls valuable resources that give it leverage as
it negotiates with its counterparts—above all, the votes that are
needed to assemble legislative majorities.129 It is for these reasons that
Robert Dahl, a leading pluralist theorist, has claimed that “few
groups . . . who are determined to influence the government . . . lack
the capacity and opportunity . . . to obtain at least some of their
goals.”130
And fifth, the pluralist safeguards for minorities do not always
work. Sometimes a group finds itself losing on issue after issue, unable
time and again to break into the majority.131 Chance alone cannot
produce such a dismal record; the flip of the coalitional coin cannot
always come out wrong. Persistent defeats also are possible only if a
group’s preferences are distinctive along several dimensions; otherwise the group’s views would overlap with the majority’s more often.
125

Id.
See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1091
(1982) (“The fact that one group is disadvantaged by a particular piece of legislation . . .
does not prove that the process has failed to function properly.”).
127 ELY, supra note 87, at 151.
128 See, e.g., Latham, supra note 122, at 391 (“Today’s losers may be tomorrow’s
winners.”); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart
Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1052 (1980).
129 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 30, at 720–22; Robert M. Cover, The Origins of
Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1302 (1982) (arguing
that groups’ votes are “too desirable a plum to leave unplucked”).
130 DAHL, supra note 121, at 386; see also, e.g., BENTLEY, supra note 121, at 271
(claiming that “[t]he lowest of despised castes . . . will still be found to be a factor in the
government”). Dahl also has emphasized the highly complex structure of the American
political system, which gives minorities many opportunities to block policies they oppose.
DAHL, supra note 121, at 326. Still another pluralist protection is the crosscutting nature of
many cleavages, which encourages majorities to take into account minorities’ interests. See
Bertrall L. Ross II, The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal
Protection Intent Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 213 (2012).
131 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 87, at 152 (referring to a minority that is “barred from the
pluralist’s bazaar”); Cover, supra note 129, at 1296 (describing groups that need protection
as “perpetual losers of the political arena”).
126

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-5\NYU503.txt

November 2015]

unknown

Seq: 23

POLITICAL POWERLESSNESS

5-NOV-15

8:56

1549

But if a group does hold unusual positions, it can end up a perpetual
loser in numerous ways. It might be less skilled than its opponents at
the cut and parry of politics.132 It might be the victim of cleavages that
are reinforcing rather than crosscutting.133 Or it might be faced with
other groups that steadfastly refuse to make deals with it.134 If any of
these conditions are present, then the pluralist promise of (at least
some) policy success turns out to be hollow.
I doubt that this account of pluralism and group power would
strike most equal protection scholars as especially original. It is, in
essence, the argument that Ely first laid out a generation ago.135 But
while the story may be familiar, its doctrinal implications are not.
Next, I show how pluralist theory, if taken seriously, urges a particular—and quite novel—understanding of the powerlessness factor.
2. Doctrinal Implications
Recall the definition of powerlessness that I outlined above. It is
useful to divide it into a series of components. A group is (1) relatively
powerless if (2) its aggregate policy preferences (3) are less likely to
be enacted (4) than those of similarly sized (5) and classified
groups.136 Each of these elements proceeds logically from the pluralist
vision that animates Carolene.
Start with the point that a group must be only relatively (rather
than absolutely) powerless in order to have a claim to suspect
status.137 In a pluralist system, a group’s likelihood of ending up in a
132 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 30, at 722–31 (explaining that diffuse and
anonymous groups are less effective at promoting their interests); Thomas W. Simon,
Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 131 (1990).
133 See, e.g., Ross, supra note 130, at 217 (discussing the possibility of structural political
impediments that repeatedly and adversely affect a minority group).
134 See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy
Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1013
(1987) (referring to the “inability of some minorities to form coalitions with other
groups”); David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251,
1257.
135 See ELY, supra note 87. Ely, however, followed Carolene’s lead in focusing on
pluralist breakdowns caused by prejudice.
136 And perhaps a sixth element should be added, for the meaning of group itself. By a
group I mean a set of people who share a particular characteristic (either objective or
subjective), and whose policy preferences have more in common than those of people
chosen at random. By this definition, blacks clearly are a cognizable group, but short
people probably are not, since despite their shared lack of height their views likely are no
more consistent than those of randomly selected individuals. See Fiss, supra note 34, at
148–49 (advancing a similar definition of a social group).
137 Most courts and scholars that have considered the matter have agreed that
powerlessness should be analyzed in relative rather than absolute terms. See, e.g., Pedersen
v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 329 (D. Conn. 2012); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of
Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 441 (Conn. 2008) (holding that plaintiffs in a gay rights case
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winning coalition can range from near-zero to near-certain. A group
can bargain (or stumble) its way into the majority anywhere from
almost never to almost always. Since a group’s odds of victory vary
along a spectrum, so should any conception of a group’s power (or
powerlessness). It makes little sense to collapse a continuous variable
into a binary one.138
A requirement of absolute powerlessness also would be nearly
impossible to satisfy.139 Take a group with distinctive preferences that
can neither promote its views effectively nor ally with other groups
(such as blacks in the Jim Crow South). Even this kind of group occasionally would see its favored policies enacted, on the uncommon
occasions when its preferences overlapped with the majority’s. The
group might lose on the matters it cared about most, but it would not
lose all of the time, on every single item. To insist on complete
powerlessness thus would be to excise powerlessness from the law.
Second, consider the claim that policy preferences should be analyzed in the aggregate rather than individually. The claim follows from
the basic pluralist premise that no group is entitled to prevail on any
particular issue—that on any single vote a group may or may not
manage to maneuver its way into the majority.140 If this premise holds,
then it is illogical to draw broad inferences about a group’s power
from any individual win or loss. To conclude that a group is powerless
(or powerful), one must take into account the full range of matters
over which groups compete—including both live items on the policy
agenda and settled subjects already incorporated into the status
quo.141 As Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have observed, pluralist
“need not demonstrate that gay persons are politically powerless in any literal sense of that
term”); Milner S. Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless Minorities, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1059,
1080 (1974) (“[P]owerlessness or vulnerability is relative.”).
138 An implication of this point is that judicial protection does not need to be all or
nothing. Courts could apply sliding-scale scrutiny based on a group’s relative
powerlessness, intensifying their review the weaker the group is and vice versa. Cf. San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(advocating a variant of this sliding-scale approach).
139 See, e.g., Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 444 (explaining that if absolute powerlessness were
necessary, then neither blacks nor women would qualify for suspect status); Hutchinson,
supra note 80, at 998 (“Complete deprivation of political power . . . is a difficult, if not
impossible, standard to meet . . . .”).
140 See supra note 126 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1668 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The minority
plainly does not have a right to prevail over majority groups in any given political
contest.”); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
76 (1980) (dismissing the idea that “each time any group loses any political battle . . . it may
lay claim to the label of ‘political weakness’”).
141 Settled subjects must be considered because, otherwise, conclusions about group
power will be skewed heavily by the agenda’s inclusion or exclusion of different issues. See
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theory “aggregates across a large set of laws and finds a democratic
failure only if a persistent minority . . . is repeatedly sacrificed for the
benefit of a persistent majority.”142
Another reason to focus on aggregate preferences is that if a
group is granted suspect status due to its powerlessness, the label
applies across the board. From then on, all laws that discriminate
against the group are subject to heightened scrutiny, not just those
arising in certain domains. As long as suspectness is a wholesale
(rather than retail) designation, then powerlessness should be too.143
However, just because all issues should be considered does not
mean they all should be considered equally. A group may hold preferences that vary widely in intensity.144 It may care a great deal about
one topic, and very little about another. In this situation, it is more
beneficial to the group, more conducive to its overall utility, if it
prevails on a matter about which it feels strongly than if it wins on a
more trivial point. Notably, pluralist theory asserts that groups often
trade their support on one item for other groups’ backing on other
items.145 This kind of negotiation can arise only if not all issues are
created equal, and it implies that preference intensity should be incorporated into powerlessness analysis.146
Third, the definition’s most vital element is that actual policy
enactment be treated as the crux of political power. This element has
been implicit throughout the above discussion of pluralism. To speak
of winning or losing coalitions is to speak of times when a group did or
did not get its preferred policies enacted. Similarly, if the thesis of
pluralism is that legislation emerges from the bargaining of different
Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947,
948–52 (1962) (arguing that agenda control is a crucial second face of power).
142 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure, 92 VA. L.
REV. 1091, 1130 (2006); see also, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 128, at 1052 (arguing that a
group can be powerless “[o]nly if ‘we-they’ distinctions cumulate across issues”).
143 See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 97, at 542 (“[B]ecause heightened scrutiny follows the
classification into all contexts, it makes sense to require that [powerlessness] also hold
across these contexts.”).
144 I speak here of groups rather than group members for the sake of consistency with
the rest of the part. Because groups are not monolithic, it also is common that their
preferences on certain issues are heterogeneous. The empirical analysis explicitly takes into
account this heterogeneity by using the proportion of a group supporting a policy change
as the key independent variable. See infra Part IV.A.
145 See supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text.
146 Cf. Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 142–61 (2000)
(suggesting that voting could be improved if it took into account preference intensity); Eric
A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics, 68
VAND. L. REV. 441 (2015) (introducing another method, quadratic voting, of taking into
account preference intensity in democratic governance).
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groups,147 then the thesis above all is one about policy outcomes. The
judgment reached by Nelson Polsby, another prominent pluralist theorist, about the most apt “indices of the power of actors” thus is unsurprising.148 After considering “(1) who participates in decision-making,
(2) who gains and who loses from alternative possible outcomes, and
(3) who prevails in decision-making,” Polsby concluded that “the last
of these seems the best way to determine which individuals and
groups have ‘more’ power.”149
But the odds of policy enactment, taken in their raw form, can be
misleading. The fourth element stipulates that, for the odds to be
meaningful, the size of a group must be controlled for. Why does size
matter? One answer is that, as a matter of probability, a larger group
is more likely than a smaller one to end up in the majority on any
given issue. It simply accounts for more of the votes that are needed
to pass a bill. Another answer is bargaining clout. A larger group typically has more leverage than a smaller one because its entry into (or
exit from) a coalition is more apt to confer (or remove) policy control.
Controlling for size thus is “essential to the responsible elaboration of
Carolene Products,” as Bruce Ackerman has put it.150 Without doing
so, there is no way to know if a group’s influence stems from its group
identity or its sheer numerosity.
Size, though, is not the only thing that must be kept constant. The
fifth and final element states that group type—such as race, gender,
sexual orientation, income, and so on—also must be held invariant.151
One reason is that group power is related to group type in complicated ways, so it is only feasible to assess a group’s clout relative to
another group identified by the same classification. For instance, the
147 See, e.g., Darryl Baskin, American Pluralism: Theory, Practice, and Ideology, 32 J.
POL. 71, 73 (1970); Latham, supra note 122, at 390 (“What may be called public policy is
actually the equilibrium reached in the group struggle at any given moment . . . .”).
148 POLSBY, supra note 123, at 4.
149 Id. (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Bachrach & Baratz, supra note 141, at 948
(“[P]luralists concentrate their attention, not upon the sources of power, but its exercise.”);
Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory—and its Future, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 223, 249 (1981) (discussing the pluralist conception of power as the ability to affect
outcomes).
150 Ackerman, supra note 30, at 722; see also, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, Poverty,
Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1332 (1993); Ross & Li,
supra note 55 (manuscript at 30) (“[L]egislators should be more concerned about the
potential preferences of larger groups than smaller groups.”); Yoshino, supra note 80, at
1804.
151 Of course, group type often is socially constructed, and one classification (such as
income) may well blur into another (such as education). And to be clear, by “type” or
“classification” I mean any characteristic, objective or subjective, that can be used to divide
the population into a discrete number of non-overlapping groups. See also supra note 136
(defining “group” for present purposes).
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power of the bottom income decile sensibly may be compared to that
of the top decile, since the groups share the same size (10%) and type
(income). But it would be far trickier to compare the bottom decile’s
power to that of blacks (a similarly sized group). Race and income are
very different classifications, so it would be unclear what conclusions
to draw from any gaps in influence.
Another reason to control for group type is that people simultaneously can be classified along multiple axes. Each of us has a race, a
gender, a sexual orientation, an income, and so on. It thus is impractical to compare the power of groups identified by different classifications because these groups often include many of the same people. To
return to the above example, the memberships of the bottom and top
income deciles do not overlap (at any given moment). But some
people are both in the bottom decile and black. This possibility of
concurrent membership can be addressed only by keeping group type
constant.152
Put these pieces together and you have my definition of
powerlessness: A group is relatively powerless if, on the whole, its
policy preferences are less likely to become law than those of other
groups of the same size and type. As this definition is somewhat
abstract, I next offer a stylized illustration of how it might be applied
to particular groups and policies.
3. Illustration
Take the category of hair color and make the following assumptions: First, that there are two equally sized groups, blondes and
brunettes. Second, that there are two policy domains, guns and butter,
which, contrary to every economics textbook, are unrelated to each
other.153 Third, that there are two options per domain, more or less
guns and more or less butter.154 Fourth, that blondes intensely prefer
more guns and mildly prefer less butter, and that brunettes mildly
prefer more guns and intensely prefer more butter. And fifth, that the
actual policy outcomes are more guns and less butter.
Now we are in a position to assess relative group influence. Initially, we see that both of blondes’ favored policies were enacted
152 See Ackerman, supra note 30, at 721 (arguing that “the decisive thought-experiment
should involve the comparison” of one group with another group that “contain[s] the same
proportion of the population” but “is unencumbered by the bargaining disadvantages” that
affect the first group).
153 Cf. GUNS AND BUTTER: THE ECONOMIC CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT
(Gregory D. Hess ed., 2009) (linking these domains in the usual economics fashion).
154 “More” and “less” here refer to one option versus the other, not to how the options
relate to the status quo.
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(more guns and less butter), compared to only one of brunettes’
(more guns). Taking preference intensity into account, the disparity
becomes even starker. Blondes prevailed whether or not they felt
strongly about a policy. Conversely, brunettes only won on a policy of
little value to them (more guns), while losing on the policy they truly
cared about (more butter). Accordingly, we would conclude that
brunettes are powerless relative to blondes. Despite being equally
numerous, their views are less likely to become law, even on the issue
that matters to them most.
Of course, groups of the same type seldom have the same population, meaning that controls for size usually must be added to the analysis. There also are many more than two policy domains and many
more than two options per domain, making it difficult to ascertain
group preferences and policy outcomes.155 And group members often
disagree with one another and differ in the intensity of their views.
These internal variations, too, must be incorporated into any estimation of overall group opinion.
Nevertheless, the basic definitional point should be clear now.
Pluralism requires a comparison of groups’ records of getting their
preferred policies enacted. A group is powerless, in pluralist terms, if
its record is worse than those of its similarly sized and classified peers.
What does this logic mean for the other notions of powerlessness that
have been suggested by courts and scholars? Below, I comment on
their deficiencies from a pluralist perspective.
B. Power Through Other Prisms
To begin with, four common definitions of group influence—
numerical size, access to the franchise, descriptive representation, and
socioeconomic status156—share the same flaw.157 All of them conceive
of power in terms other than actual policy enactment. True, a group’s
preferences are more likely to be converted into law, all else being
equal, if the group is large, free to vote, represented by its own members, or affluent. In fact, I previously explained why numerical size is
such an important determinant of policy success that the latter can be
analyzed properly only by controlling for the former.158 But neither
155 Furthermore, different policy domains often are linked, and it is hard not to pay
more attention to the status quo than to other policy options.
156 See supra Part I (presenting these conceptions of group power).
157 I do not mean to be too critical of these definitions. They all are correlated with
actual policy enactment, which is no small thing. They also are consistent with important
democratic values such as civic participation, proportional representation, and social
egalitarianism. They just are not consistent with the particular democratic theory,
pluralism, on which Carolene is based.
158 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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numerical size, nor any of the three candidates grouped with it, are
equivalent to policy success. At best, they are some of its drivers: factors that make it more likely, but not certain, that a group’s preferences will be heeded.
Ely has made this point nicely with respect to access to the
franchise and descriptive representation. “If voices and votes are all
we’re talking about . . . other groups may just continue to refuse to
deal, and the minority in question may just continue to be outvoted.”159 In other words, a group’s odds of passing its preferred policies may be too low even if the group is enfranchised and represented
by its own members. A district court in Connecticut has offered a similar rebuttal to the argument that gays are politically powerful because
they wield “corporate power” and control “significant sums of
money.”160 There is “no authority or evidence demonstrating that this
‘corporate power’ has effected appreciable socio-economic or political
change,” and “despite these sums raised, gay men and lesbians are still
unable to impact the outcome of legislative processes.”161 Affluence,
that is, does not necessarily translate into legislative victory.162
The last proposed definition of group influence—the passage of
protective legislation163—improves substantially on the previous four.
It indeed examines what pluralist theory deems the essence of political power, namely actual policy enactment,164 rather than factors that
may or may not lead to it. The drawback of this approach, though, is
that it does not cast its net widely enough. It looks only to the passage
of protective legislation, not to the passage of all legislation, protective
or otherwise.165 It thus violates the pluralist tenet that groups’ preferences should be considered in the aggregate, not individually, because
159 ELY, supra note 87, at 161; see also, e.g., Bradley R. Hogin, Equal Protection,
Democratic Theory, and the Case of the Poor, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 25 (1989) (“In pluralist
democracy, certain groups are politically powerless, even though they have the right to
vote . . . .”); Strauss, supra note 100, at 154, 159.
160 Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 331–32 (D. Conn. 2012).
161 Id.
162 And, to finish off the list, it is obvious that a group can be both numerically large and
a perennial loser in the political process (or vice versa). See, e.g., Ball, supra note 137, at
1080 (“A group may be small in number but . . . possessed of the power to protect itself.”);
Strauss, supra note 100, at 155 (rejecting the “notion that being a minority renders a group
powerless in the political arena simply by virtue of its numbers”).
163 See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text.
165 See, e.g., Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 331 (“The passage of such legislation suggests
only an isolated achievement . . . and is not indicative of . . . political clout . . . .”); Strauss,
supra note 100, at 156 (“A group can be both politically powerless and have some
legislation passed on its behalf.”).
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no minority is entitled to prevail on any particular matter.166 It
improperly highlights one small corner of the vast issue universe.
To see why this narrow focus is problematic, suppose that a group
is unable to secure the enactment of a law banning discrimination
against its members. Suppose also that most of the group’s other
policy priorities (on taxes, spending, crime, the environment, and so
on) are followed by the legislature. Is it really fair to say that the
group is politically powerless? Is it not more accurate to conclude that
the group actually is quite influential—just not omnipotent? Conversely, imagine that a group wins the passage of an anti-discrimination law, but loses on almost every other policy item. The group’s lone
triumph, even on an issue it may care about dearly, cannot possibly
transform it into a political powerhouse.
This critique also applies to the more expansive variants of the
protective-legislation definition used by some courts: namely, whether
a group is able to prevent the enactment of laws victimizing it; and
whether a group is able, though the political process, to end societal
discrimination against it.167 Both of these variants should be commended for broadening the inquiry beyond protective legislation
alone. But both remain vulnerable to pluralist attack for not broadening it enough. The policy set of protective and antagonistic legislation, relating to de jure and societal discrimination, still amounts to
only a fraction of all the issues that should be analyzed in assessing
group power. It continues to be possible that a group thwarts bills
persecuting it and extinguishes societal prejudice against it while
losing on all other matters (or vice versa).
A further objection to the existing notions of powerlessness—
albeit a doctrinal rather than a theoretical one—is that they are difficult to reconcile with the Court’s suspect class designations.168 Numerical size is a problematic definition because women are a suspect class
despite comprising a majority of the population.169 The right to vote is
inadequate because women, racial minorities, and religious groups are
all enfranchised, while minors (who are not a suspect class) are not.170
166

See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
168 They are difficult, rather than impossible, to reconcile because powerlessness is only
one of the indicia of suspect status. A group could be powerless but still not a suspect class
(or vice versa) depending on which way the other indicia point.
169 See ELY, supra note 87, at 164 (“Finally, lest you think I missed it, women have
about half the votes, apparently more.”).
170 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (observing that
“[m]inors cannot vote and thus might be considered politically powerless to an extreme
degree” under a franchise theory).
167
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Descriptive representation fails because blacks are represented
roughly proportionately,171 while the poor (not a suspect class) are
sharply underrepresented.172 Socioeconomic status misfires because
Asian Americans173 and Jews174 are protected despite their relative
affluence, while the poor are unprotected despite being, well, poor.
And the passage of protective legislation implies that women, racial
minorities, and religious groups (all the beneficiaries of numerous
laws) should not be suspect classes.175
Of course, it is not a fatal weakness that a proposed definition
fails to account fully for current doctrine. Some of the proponents of
the above approaches may well want to modify the Court’s suspect
class designations. But if that is their intent, they have not said so
explicitly.176 They also have not acknowledged the sweeping transformations of equal protection law that several of their preferred options
would entail—in particular, the potential end of suspect status for
blacks and women. In contrast, as I explain later in the Article, my
conception of powerlessness would not result in such radical
change.177 It would preserve the current position of blacks and women
(though it also would support the inclusion of the poor in the ranks of
the suspect classes). This greater consistency with existing law is perhaps a minor point in favor of my approach.
This concludes my definitional argument, meaning that I could
proceed directly to my empirical analysis of powerlessness. (And
readers who are impatient to get to the empirics are encouraged to
skip ahead.) But before attempting to quantify powerlessness, I think
it is important to try to come to grips with the various issues it impli171 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
769, 834 (2013) (noting that blacks account for 13% of population and 10% of members of
Congress).
172 See Ross & Li, supra note 55 (manuscript at 4) (noting that only 6% of members of
Congress serving from 1999 to 2008 worked in blue-collar jobs).
173 See Median Income of People in Constant (2009) Dollars by Sex, Race, and Hispanic
Origin: 1990 to 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/
statab/2012/tables/12s0701.pdf (showing that median income is higher for Asian Americans
than for whites, blacks, or Hispanics).
174 See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE
SURVEY 60 (2008) (showing that 46% of Jewish respondents have an annual income of
above $100,000, compared to 18% of the general population).
175 See Hutchinson, supra note 80, at 995 (“If the Court used this same standard
consistently, it would disqualify all of the existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes as
candidates for judicial solicitude.”); Strauss, supra note 100, at 157 (noting this implication
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Acts of 1868 and 1964).
176 But see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that women should not be considered a suspect class because they are not
politically powerless).
177 See infra Parts III–IV.
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cates.178 Next, I sort these issues into three categories, involving (1)
the causes and levels of group power; (2) the legal place of the
powerlessness doctrine; and (3) courts’ capacity to implement the doctrine. I do not purport to wrestle these difficult matters to the ground,
but I do begin what I hope is a useful exploration of some intriguing
and understudied subjects.
C. Powerlessness in Perspective
1. Causes and Levels
Perhaps the most obvious question raised by the powerlessness
factor is whether it matters what the reason is for a group’s lack of
influence. In Carolene itself, the Court offered one potential cause of
powerlessness: “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” that
prevents them from enjoying sufficient policy success.179 Scholars subsequently have criticized Carolene’s hypothesis, on the ground that
discreteness and insularity often contribute to, rather than detract
from, a group’s clout.180 They also have proposed several causes of
their own. For instance, Ackerman has argued that a group’s anonymity and diffuseness typically sap its political strength.181 Jack
Balkin has emphasized the link between resources and power,
claiming that it is asset-deprived groups that are most prone to weakness.182 Bradley Hogin has made a similar point with respect to participation: Groups whose members are less politically engaged may
suffer at the bargaining table.183 And political scientists have

178 These issues also could be framed as objections to my definitional argument, to
which I now respond.
179 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
180 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 30, at 723; Strauss, supra note 134, at 1264
(“[M]embers of discrete and insular groups will in fact exercise greater power than their
numbers warrant.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 29, 34 (1985).
181 See Ackerman, supra note 30, at 724 (“[G]roups that are ‘anonymous and diffuse’ . . .
are systematically disadvantaged in a pluralist democracy.”).
182 See J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 309 (1989) (referring to “the
most obvious cause of all—disparities in political power caused by differences in economic
power”).
183 See Hogin, supra note 159, at 29 (focusing on groups’ “chronic quiescence”). At the
edge of the participational spectrum are groups that deliberately choose not to engage at
all in the political process (perhaps the Amish in Pennsylvania or certain ultra-Orthodox
Jews in Israel). Classic pluralist theory does not contemplate the existence of such groups,
and it may be a bit rich for minorities that intentionally exclude themselves from the
pluralist fray then to complain that their policy preferences have not been heeded.
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explained how party coalitions,184 leadership positions,185 and institutional structures186 may shape power as well.
Carolene can be read to claim that the reason for a group’s
powerlessness does matter—and, indeed, must be “prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities.”187 Justice Scalia apparently endorsed
this view in a recent concurrence, suggesting that blacks in Michigan
are not a suspect class because they neither are insular nor face
prejudice from other groups.188 On the other hand, the powerlessness
doctrine itself, in its classic formulation, makes no reference to any
causes.189 And in a 1982 concurrence, Justice Blackmun asserted
bluntly, “it never has been suggested that the reason for a discrete
class’s political powerlessness is significant; instead, the fact of
powerlessness is crucial.”190 So which is it? Does powerlessness always
support a designation of suspect status, or only if Carolene’s hypothesis is confirmed?
Based on pluralist theory, I think the answer has to be the
former. As discussed above, pluralism fails to protect minorities if
their aggregate preferences are heeded less often than those of groups
of a similar size and type.191 Under this conception of pluralist failure,
the explanation for a group’s relative lack of political success is irrelevant. All that matters is that the group in fact loses more often than it
should, because the group then is not benefiting from the mechanisms
that are supposed to assure it its fair share of legislative wins. To put
the point another way, the promise of pluralism is that each group will
184 See, e.g., CHRISTIAN R. GROSE, CONGRESS IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND
REPRESENTATION IN WASHINGTON AND AT HOME 55 (2011).
185 See, e.g., KERRY L. HAYNIE, AFRICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATORS IN THE AMERICAN
STATES 75–81 (2001).
186 See, e.g., Zoltan L. Hajnal et al., Minorities and Direct Legislation: Evidence from
California Ballot Proposition Elections, 64 J. POL. 154, 155–56 (2002).
Still another possibility is that a group loses more often than its peers because its
policy preferences are, on net, ideologically extreme and so far from the midpoint of public
opinion. This explanation also is in tension with classic pluralist theory, whose perspective
on groups’ interests is distinctly transactional and non-ideological. And in its emphasis on
the median voter, the explanation seems more consistent with majoritarianism, which is
not a theory that can be reconciled with pluralism. See infra Part II.C.2.
187 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
188 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1645 (2014)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Nor does [the dissent] explain why certain racial
minorities in Michigan qualify as insular, meaning that other groups will not form
coalitions with them—and, critically, not because of lack of common interests but because
of prejudice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (asking
whether a group is “relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”).
190 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
191 See supra Part II.A.
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end up in the prevailing coalition as frequently as its similarly sized
and classified peers. If a group does not end up in the majority as
often, no matter what the reason, the promise has not been kept.192
True, there is a certain oddity to pledging allegiance to Carolene’s
theory but not to its text. But the text is tentative rather than sure.
“Nor need we enquire,” wrote the Court, whether its posited cause
“may be a special condition” that “tends seriously to curtail” the usual
pluralist safeguards.193 The text also turns out to be wrong.
Ackerman’s famous argument that discreteness and insularity usually
enhance group power devastated Carolene’s hypothesis, and it has not
been rehabilitated since.194 The oddity of ignoring Carolene’s text thus
pales in comparison to the strangeness of taking it seriously. If
powerlessness had to be produced by prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities, it very rarely would be found. At the same time, the
political weakness that does handicap many groups, caused by anonymity, diffuseness, poverty, alienation, and the like, would fail to register on the judicial consciousness.
But for my position on causality to be convincing, it is not just
Carolene’s hypothesis that must be rejected, but the need for any
reason for powerlessness. How, then, to respond to Laurence Tribe’s
well-known hypothetical about burglars—a group that presumably
lacks political influence due to its misconduct, but for whom
“[s]uspect status is unthinkable”?195 One tack is to deny the premise.
Burglars’ preferences as to the crime of burglary routinely may be
rebuffed (since the crime exists), but it is entirely unclear how often
they find themselves in the winning coalition on other matters. We no
more can conclude from burglars’ loss on the burglary issue that they
are powerless, than we can from other groups’ inability to pass protec192 For scholars making similar arguments, see Ball, supra note 137, at 1080 (“What
engages judicial protection is a minority’s impotence in protecting itself, whether insular or
not.”); Loffredo, supra note 150, at 1335 (“Why should the absence of prejudice end the
inquiry into democratic malfunction?”). Cf. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 63 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (concluding that, in polarization analysis under the Voting Rights Act,
“only the correlation between race of voter and selection of certain candidates, not the
causes of the correlation, matters”).
193 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added);
see also Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1093, 1098 (1982) (noting that footnote four was “offered not as a settled theorem of
government or Court-approved standard of judicial review, but as a starting point for
debate”).
194 See Ackerman, supra note 30; see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 94, at 699
(describing Ackerman’s argument as “an intellectual tour de force”).
195 Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1075 (1980).
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tive legislation.196 A single defeat does not make a minority a perpetual victim.
The other answer to the hypothetical is that the sky would not fall
if burglars in fact were deemed powerless. For one thing, powerlessness is just one of the indicia of suspect status.197 None of the other
indicia apply to burglars, meaning that their lack of clout would not
give them a very strong claim to judicial protection. For another, even
if burglars did qualify as a suspect class, the only consequence would
be that policies discriminating against them, such as the one criminalizing burglary, would be subject to heightened scrutiny. But there is
little doubt that these policies would survive the more rigorous examination. In Ely’s words, “There is so patently a substantial goal here . . .
and the fit between that goal and the classification is so close, that
whatever suspicion such a classification might . . . engender is allayed
so immediately it doesn’t even have time to register.”198
Now shift gears from the causes of group power to its levels. It
should be obvious that a group’s political influence can vary from one
period or jurisdiction to the next. A group might find itself on the
losing side of too many policy disputes in a given time or place. But, in
another, the group might prevail just as often as we would expect
given its size and type. The question then becomes whether legal findings of powerlessness (with the suspect class designations that, in part,
follow from them) should reflect these fluctuations in clout.
In a 1989 case, the Court hinted that they should.199 Faced with a
minority set-aside program passed by the majority-black Richmond
City Council, the Court assumed without deciding that “the level of
scrutiny varies according to the ability of different groups to defend
their interests in the representative process.”200 Since blacks controlled this particular city’s government, they were not a powerless
group in this location.201 Conversely, in a 1978 case, the Court sharply
criticized the idea that suspect status should differ temporally or spa196 See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text (explaining that the passage of
protective legislation is a faulty notion of group power because it does not consider
aggregate policy preferences).
197 For a more extended discussion of the other indicia, see infra Part II.C.2.
198 ELY, supra note 87, at 154. To put this point in doctrinal terms, the state has a
compelling interest in condemning harmful practices like burglary, as well as in reducing
the actual volume of burglary. A law criminalizing burglary clearly serves the state’s
expressive interest in condemnation, and presumably (though it is an empirical question)
serves the state’s interest in making burglary rarer too.
199 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
200 Id.
201 See id. (“Five of the nine seats on the city council are held by blacks.”). Similarly,
under the Court’s Section 2 doctrine, a group’s ability to “elect representatives of [its]
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tially. If “judicial scrutiny of classifications touching on racial and
ethnic background may vary with the ebb and flow of political forces,”
then there is no “consistent application of the Constitution from one
generation to the next.”202
Under pluralist theory, it seems clear that powerlessness analysis
should be dynamic. If a group was a perennial loser in another time or
place, but is not in this one, then there is no clout-based reason for the
group to enjoy extra judicial protection. It is navigating the political
shoals adeptly on its own, just as pluralism expects it to. Likewise, if a
group won its fair share of policy battles under other circumstances,
but does not do so here, then its claim to suspect status should not be
undercut by its erstwhile successes. The pluralist breakdown in this
setting should not be overlooked because the pluralist machinery
operated smoothly sometime or somewhere else.203
The temporal instability implied by this approach does not strike
me as problematic. As the Article’s empirical sections show, the influence of most groups does not change very much over time. In fact,
groups recognized as suspect classes decades ago, such as racial minorities and women, remain relatively powerless today.204 And if they
eventually were to develop sufficient sway, then I think it would be
appropriate for their privileged legal position to be rethought. They
no longer would have the same need for it, despite their past defeats.
I am more concerned, however, about the approach’s spatial
instability. For one thing, it probably is not feasible for courts to make
localized determinations of powerlessness—to conclude, say, that
blacks have enough influence in North Carolina but not South Carolina, or in Newark but not New York City. For another, in our complex and multilayered system, it is doubtful that power can be assessed
coherently at a subnational level. If women are politically ineffective
choice,” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b), may vary temporally and spatially as levels of political
cohesion and racial polarization fluctuate.
202 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 2986–99 (1978) (plurality
opinion). Other courts also have expressed skepticism about recognizing variations in
group power. See, e.g., Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1014 (W.D. Wisc. 2014), aff’d
sub nom. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014);
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 502 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J.,
dissenting) (“No one has ever suggested—nor do I—that, once established, a class entitled
to heightened scrutiny protection may subsequently lose that status if its political power
grows substantially.”).
203 Other scholars have made similar arguments. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 30, at
733–34; Eskridge, supra note 93, at 2379; Fiss, supra note 34, at 155; Felix Gilman, The
Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV.
163, 177 (2004) (explaining that pluralist theory “avoid[s] the danger of tagging any group
with the status of a permanent victim—or, equally disturbingly, with the status of a
permanent preferred group”).
204 See infra Parts III–IV.
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in Chicago, effective in Illinois, and ineffective again in Washington,
D.C., for instance, what is a court to do?205 For these reasons, my
provisional view is that powerlessness should be analyzed with respect
to the country as a whole. A group’s clout at different governmental
levels can and should be taken into account, but a single national
answer should be reached at any given time.206
So much, then, for the causes and levels of group power. Next, I
discuss the second set of issues implicated by the powerlessness factor:
namely, how it relates to the other suspect class criteria, to equal protection doctrine in its entirety, and to the democratic theories that
underlie constitutional law. All of these issues probe the place of
powerlessness in our legal system.207
2. Legal Position
Start with the other indicia of suspect status: (1) whether a group
has experienced a history of discrimination; (2) whether a group is
defined by an immutable characteristic; and (3) whether a group is
defined by a trait that typically bears no relation to the group’s ability
to contribute to society.208 How is powerlessness linked to these factors? Unfortunately, the Court has never said. Instead, it has applied
the criteria in what a lower court politely has described as a “flexible
manner,”209 sometimes addressing and sometimes inexplicably
ignoring each element. In Michael Dorf’s stronger language, when
205 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 553–54 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that even if
blacks were powerful in Richmond itself, “the numerical and political dominance of
nonminorities within the State of Virginia and the Nation as a whole provides an enormous
political check” on their influence).
206 See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 351 (D.C. App. 1995) (Ferren, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he focus on political power . . . has to be
national, not local, lest constitutional rights vary from city to city.”).
207 A related question is how the powerlessness doctrine compares to the chief statutory
protection for minority groups, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A group’s political
influence plainly is relevant to “whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the
part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group,”
which is one of the factors that courts consider in Section 2’s totality-of-circumstances
inquiry. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 37, 45 (1986) (plurality opinion) (quoting S.
REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But Section 2’s key
goal is that minorities be able to elect their preferred candidates in sufficient numbers. This
variant of descriptive representation is quite different from the pluralistic theory that
underpins the powerlessness doctrine.
208 For examples of courts identifying and then analyzing these criteria, see Windsor v.
United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181–85 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), Kerrigan v.
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 425–61 (Conn. 2008), and Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862, 886–96 (Iowa 2009).
209 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 888.
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courts consider whether to dub a group a suspect class, “[t]he embarrassing fact of the matter is that they simply make it up.”210
If courts were not to make it up, one option would be to prioritize
powerlessness over the other three factors. As explained earlier, there
is a strong pluralist case for conferring heightened protection to a
group that loses too often in the political process.211 This case is not
weakened if the group is lucky enough not to have been discriminated
against historically, or if its defining trait is mutable or sometimes germane to its societal contributions. Even if the other criteria go unmet,
there still has been a pluralist malfunction that requires a judicial
response. Following precisely this logic, as Marcy Strauss has noted,
“some courts consider political powerlessness to be the ultimate question and view the other factors as subissues.”212
This is not to say that the other factors would be irrelevant if
powerlessness became the one criterion to rule them all. In certain
cases, they could help illuminate why a group does or does not lack
influence. For example, a history of discrimination, like the
“prejudice” cited by Carolene, is one reason why a group may be less
able to bargain effectively with other parties.213 Similarly, as Jeffrey
Roy has argued, immutable traits are more likely to divide society into
a set of stable coalitions, one of which then may extract rents at the
expense of the others.214 These kinds of explanations would not be
required under a powerlessness-centered approach (since it would be
the existence of powerlessness, not its causes, that would be dispositive). But they could add context and texture to the key judicial
inquiry.215
210 Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 964 (2002); see
also, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CALIF. L. REV. 481, 503
(2004) (arguing that the suspect class criteria “suffer from both misapplication and
theoretical inconsistencies”).
211 See supra Part II.A.
212 Strauss, supra note 100, at 153; see also Yoshino, supra note 97, at 565 (“I propose
that the limiting principle [for suspect class designations] should be a refined analysis of
political powerlessness.”).
213 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); see also MARTHA
C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 117 (2010) (“[W]hen there is a lot of prejudice, a group probably
doesn’t have much opportunity to influence legislators . . . .”).
214 See Jeffrey A. Roy, Carolene Products: A Game-Theoretic Approach, 2002 BYU L.
REV. 53, 87 (explaining that “a trait used for rent seeking” is likely to be “immutable in the
sense that the memberships of the majority and minority should be subject to little change
over time”).
215 This is a good place to note that even if suspect status were based exclusively on
powerlessness, the grant of the former would be unlikely to end the latter. Suspect status
would mean that laws discriminating against the powerless group are subject to heightened
scrutiny. But more radical action, involving legislation rather than litigation, probably
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However, there are at least two arguments against ranking
powerlessness above the other indicia. First, while there is a strong
pluralist case for judicial intervention if a group is too politically weak,
there is no reason why pluralism has to be the dispositive theory for
suspect status designations. The powerlessness factor may be derived
from Carolene, which in turn may be derived from pluralism—but the
other factors flow from theories of their own, which cannot be dismissed simply because they are different. The idea of suspect status
also is not tied as closely to Carolene as is powerlessness,216 meaning
that the former does not necessarily share the latter’s pluralist
orientation.
Second, prioritizing powerlessness would entail prioritizing its
particular conception of suspect status. But this conception is controversial, and it conflicts with the understanding embodied in some of
the other indicia. More specifically, powerlessness and a history of discrimination both apply to particular groups and so imply that classes
should be suspect. But immutability and societal relevance both apply
to particular traits and so imply that classifications should be suspect.
The first two indicia suggest that extra judicial attention should be
reserved for blacks but not whites, women but not men, gays but not
straights, and so on. But the latter two mean that all groups defined by
race, gender, sexuality, and the like should be protected—the privileged no less than the disadvantaged.217
I do not believe this conflict can be papered over. Thinking about
suspect status in terms of classes is fundamentally at odds with
thinking about it in terms of classifications. Beyond noting the doctrinal discord, though, I would make one further point: The fact that
courts continue to employ all four criteria indicates that they have not,
as is sometimes supposed,218 concluded that only classifications can be
would be needed to realize the pluralist vision. However, this point also applies to all of the
other indicia of suspect status. Suspect status would not end discrimination against a group
or make its defining trait less immutable or more societally relevant either. There is a
general lack of fit between the indicia and the consequences of suspect status.
216 The Court began using the terminology of suspect status in the 1970s, in cases such as
Rodriguez, without explicitly linking the concept to Carolene. See San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
217 I am not the first to notice the tension at the heart of the indicia. See, e.g., Goldberg,
supra note 210, at 504; Ortiz, supra note 101, at 732 (“The Court applies both process
review and its naughty opposite, substantive review, at the same time.”); Yoshino, supra
note 97, at 563 (“The tension between the class-based view and the classification-based
view manifests itself in the standard heightened scrutiny test.”).
218 See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (noting and
challenging “the common assumption that, during the Second Reconstruction, the
anticlassification principle triumphed”).
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deemed suspect. There must be something left to the notion of suspect
classes if two of the four criteria see the world in terms of groups
rather than traits. Plainly, the suspect class approach has lost ground
since Carolene’s original group-focused formulation.219 But it is fairer
to label the status quo a stalemate than a rout for the suspect classification side.220
Essentially the same point holds if the level of generality is raised
from the indicia of suspect status to the overarching theories of equal
protection. The powerlessness factor is remarkably consistent with the
anti-subordination theory, which maintains that courts should scrutinize most closely laws that disproportionately harm subordinated
groups.221 Almost by definition, groups that are politically powerless
are politically subordinated too.222 But the anti-subordination theory
is not the dominant account of equal protection law. Instead, it is the
anti-differentiation theory, which requires stricter review for laws that
distinguish among people on certain grounds, that is ascendant.223 The
anti-differentiation theory, like the suspect classification approach,
treats all groups defined by the same trait identically.224 It thus is
irreconcilable with the claim that the powerless, but not the powerful,
are entitled to enhanced judicial protection.
Again, then, the continued existence of the powerlessness factor
shows that the triumph of anti-differentiation over anti-subordination
219 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (referring to
“discrete and insular minorities”).
220 The enormous volume of case law on whether gays are a suspect class, see supra Part
I.A., confirms the continued relevance of the group-focused criteria. So do the Court’s
repeated analyses of powerlessness even after supposedly endorsing the antidifferentiation theory in the 1970s. See cases cited supra note 89.
221 See Fiss, supra note 34, at 155 (referring jointly to blacks’ “perpetual subordination
and circumscribed political power” as the reason why they should qualify as a suspect
class). See generally Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92
MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994).
222 See Roy, supra note 214, at 78 (“The Carolene Products approach ties naturally to an
antisubordination theory because it focuses on a group’s lack of power in the political
process.”).
223 See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1537 (2004) (describing the
“conventional understanding” that “the Court embraced anticlassification and repudiated
antisubordination”); see also supra note 33 (explaining my reasons for labeling this theory
“anti-differentiation”).
224 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720
(2007) (“It is well established that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on
the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.”);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (advancing “the basic
principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect persons,
not groups”).
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is incomplete. If it were complete, the Court would not tolerate a criterion that sounds so clearly in anti-subordination. Nor is the
powerlessness factor the only doctrinal outpost of anti-subordination
values. As Reva Siegel has documented, they also persist in the state
interest in diversity, which prizes the participation of marginalized
groups;225 in disparate impact law, which upholds facially neutral policies aimed at helping minorities;226 and in the definition of racial classification, which omits certain benign uses of racial categories.227
These further manifestations of anti-subordination principles confirm
that the powerlessness factor is no outlier, no artifact of a bygone legal
era. The factor bears witness, rather, that the struggle over the soul of
equal protection still rages.
Now raise the level of generality by one more notch, from the
theories of equal protection to the theories of democracy on which
much of constitutional law is built. As I have reiterated, the
powerlessness factor is rooted in one particular democratic theory:
pluralism, the idea that when many groups compete and bargain with
one another, no group is excluded permanently from the majority and
policy approximating the public interest emerges from the contestation.228 But pluralism is not the only available democratic theory,229
and it has endured attacks from many different quarters. So what happens to the powerlessness doctrine if pluralism itself is discredited?
It depends on the critique. Several of the best-known challenges
to pluralism accept its normative premise that it would be desirable if
similarly sized and classified groups were equally likely to end up in
the prevailing coalition. They just allege that this equal likelihood is
illusory. For instance, public choice theory contends that concentrated
groups enjoy more policy success than diffuse ones, because they are
better able to organize effectively and avoid free-rider problems.230
225 See Siegel, supra note 223, at 1539 (explaining that the diversity interest includes
“ensuring that no group is excluded from participating in public life and thus relegated
to . . . second-class status”).
226 See id. at 1541 (observing that “facially neutral, racially allocative state action that
benefits subordinate groups is constitutionally permissible”).
227 See id. at 1543 (noting that courts uphold “racial data collection . . . without
characterizing it as a racial classification subject to the presumption of
unconstitutionality”).
228 See supra Part II.A.
229 On the essentially contested nature of democracy, see generally Jane S. Schacter, Ely
and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 737 (2004).
230 See also BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 118, at 67 (claiming that with the
emergence of public choice theory, “the pluralist perspective was essentially dead”); Saul
Levmore, Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 259 (1999)
(arguing that public choice theory is most applicable “where there are excellent
opportunities to influence agenda setters or to bargain for the formation of winning
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Similarly, E.E. Schattschneider has quipped memorably that “[t]he
flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a
strong upper-class accent.”231 Affluent groups, that is, systematically
outperform poorer ones. Crucially, if either public choice theory or
Schattschneider is correct, the implication is not that the powerlessness factor should be discarded. The upshot, instead, is that pluralism
breaks down relatively often, and thus that a relatively large number
of groups lack sufficient influence. This is a rationale for greater judicial intervention, not for renunciation of the underlying pluralist hope.
On the other hand, other democratic theories amount to rejections of pluralism all the way down. Take the raw majoritarianism that
is implicit in the second paragraph of Carolene’s fourth footnote.232 If
there is such a thing as a consistent majority—and if its preferences
deserve to be followed as a normative matter—then the conceptual
foundation of the powerlessness doctrine collapses. In a purely
majoritarian democracy, minorities are entitled only to lose. Their
repeated setbacks are par for the course, not cause for judicial concern.233 Likewise, consider democratic theories that focus on participation234 or deliberation.235 It is irrelevant to them as well if certain
groups fail to join the winning coalition with sufficient regularity. Perpetual defeat is perfectly consistent with extensive civic engagement
or enlightened public discourse.
coalitions”). See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (rev. ed. 1971).
231 SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 118, at 35; see also, e.g., William E. Connolly, The
Challenge to Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 3, 15 (William E. Connolly ed.,
1969) (“[T]he pluralist system is significantly biased toward the concerns and priorities of
corporate elites.”).
232 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (referring to
majoritarianism when describing “those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation”); Klarman, supra note 92, at 781
(explaining that Carolene’s second paragraph treats majoritarianism as “the linchpin of our
political system”).
233 See Ackerman, supra note 30, at 719 (“[M]inorities are supposed to lose in a
[majoritarian] system—even when they want very much to win . . . .”). Essentially the same
point applies to theories focusing on political parties. See, e.g., E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER,
PARTY GOVERNMENT (1942) (setting forth an approach based on party accountability). If
stable and coherent parties exist, then fluid pluralist competition does not.
234 See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS
FOR A NEW AGE (1984); see also Hogin, supra note 159, at 29 (noting that participatory
democracy “dramatically expands the scope of equal protection review beyond the
Carolene Products model”).
235 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
(1996); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1689, 1692 (1984) (arguing that deliberative democracy “is especially at odds with
pluralism”).
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To be sure, these theories contemplate democratic malfunctions
of their own. For a majoritarian, the great fear is that the majority’s
views will not be heeded, perhaps because of problems in the electoral
system.236 For a participatory democrat, public alienation from politics
is the bête noire.237 And for a deliberative democrat, policy enacted
due to “naked preferences,” not public-regarding reasons, is the
deepest concern.238 But the key point here is that even if these malfunctions support judicial involvement, the kind of activity they justify
bears no resemblance to that entailed by the powerlessness doctrine.
A court that intervened to ease the passage of items favored by the
majority, to rouse the citizenry from its dormancy, or to strike down
poorly reasoned legislation, would be operating in a manner entirely
alien to the doctrine. Accordingly, if pluralism is cast aside in favor of
another full-blown theory of democracy, the powerlessness factor
must be tossed out with it. The factor cannot survive the replacement
of the pluralist hope with a different democratic aspiration.239
Shifting from the theoretical to the practical, can the factor even
survive its judicial implementation? In other words, are courts actually
capable of identifying powerless groups and then riding to their
rescue? These issues of institutional capacity are the last ones I
address in this Part.
3. Judicial Capacity
In a series of recent articles, Eskridge,240 Schacter,241 and
Yoshino242 all have identified an irony at the core of the powerlessness
doctrine. In their view, courts applying the doctrine typically confer
suspect status to powerful groups and deny it to the truly powerless.243
236 For an argument along these lines, emphasizing the many ways that electoral rules
can produce misalignment with the majority’s views, see generally Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283 (2014).
237 See, e.g., Hogin, supra note 159, at 29 (describing “chronic quiescence” with respect
to the political process as an “afflict[ion]”).
238 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 235, at 1692 (distinguishing “naked preferences” from
“public value[s]” as drivers of government action).
239 In this vein, it is important to note that the popularity of pluralism has declined since
its mid-twentieth-century heyday. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 118, at
87; Ross, supra note 118, at 1610. The continuing existence of the powerlessness factor thus
puts us in the unusual position of having to develop a doctrine based on a theory that is no
longer widely accepted.
240 See Eskridge, supra note 54, at 18 (“[I]f a minority group is totally powerless . . . the
Equal Protection Clause will not protect that group.”).
241 See Schacter, supra note 77, at 1399 (“[I]t is strikingly implausible to think that
judges . . . can or will stand apart from prevailing public opinion . . . .”).
242 See Yoshino, supra note 108.
243 Michael Klarman also has made this point with respect to Supreme Court
intervention generally (rather than the powerlessness factor specifically). See generally
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As Yoshino has put it, “A group must have an immense amount of
political power before it will be deemed politically powerless.”244 One
explanation for this curious pattern is that judges may be as vulnerable to biases and blind spots as the rest of society. They may be conditioned to respond favorably to the claims of influential groups and
to spurn those of pariahs.245 Another explanation is that courts may
be wary of the repercussions of ruling in favor of marginalized minorities. In Eskridge’s words, courts that “rile prejudiced majorities . . .
risk[ ] a tremendous popular backlash.”246
One response to this alleged irony is that it is largely beside the
point. My main goals in this Article are to define powerlessness in a
theoretically sensible way and to measure its levels for different
groups. The legal realist claim that courts do not enforce the
powerlessness doctrine properly is not particularly relevant to these
normative and empirical aims. It demonstrates that courts are not following the law, but it says nothing about what courts should do, especially if they were given the requisite data.247
This response, though, is not very satisfying. Is implies ought: If
courts inevitably ignore the powerless, there is little point to defining
powerlessness more precisely and imploring courts to stick to the
improved definition.248 But I do not think there is anything inevitable
about it. First, as an institutional matter, courts seem relatively wellsuited to implementing the powerlessness doctrine. Their steady
stream of cases exposes them to many unpopular litigants, making it
plausible that they will be more receptive to these parties’ pleas than
other governmental actors. At the federal level, judges also have life
tenure, and so are more insulated than other actors from the political
consequences of their decisions. These characteristics may not make

MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
244 Yoshino, supra note 108, at 541.
245 See ELY, supra note 87, at 168 (“Judges tend to belong to the same broad categories
as legislators . . . and there isn’t any reason to suppose that they are immune to the usual
temptations of self-aggrandizing generalization.”); Eskridge, supra note 54, at 18; Schacter,
supra note 77, at 1399.
246 Eskridge, supra note 54, at 25–26.
247 This also is my response to the claim that the powerlessness factor—and, indeed, all
of the suspect class criteria—does not matter very much because courts can reach their
preferred outcomes regardless of the level of scrutiny they apply. Even if this claim is
correct, it is largely irrelevant to my effort here to get to the bottom of how the
powerlessness factor should be implemented.
248 This is why Eskridge and Schacter both urge the elimination of the powerlessness
factor. See Eskridge, supra note 54, at 20; Schacter, supra note 77, at 1403.
THE
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courts attentive to the powerless in any absolute sense, but they at
least should yield comparative advantages.249
And second, as a factual matter, courts do not always reject the
claims of vulnerable groups. The quintessential suspect classes, by
most accounts, are blacks and women. As the next two Parts illustrate,
both of these groups remain relatively powerless because, controlling
for size, their preferences are much less likely to be enacted than
those of whites and men.250 Blacks and women may not lack any influence at all, but this has never been the doctrinal test. Accordingly, the
irony spotted by Eskridge, Schacter, and Yoshino evaporates once a
theoretically suitable definition of powerlessness is adopted.251 By
providing greater protection to blacks and women, courts have proven
that they are willing to grant suspect status to groups that merit it. The
courthouse door is not just open to the powerful.
Willingness to protect the powerless, though, is not the only
capacity-related issue that must be considered. Courts also must be
able to tell whether groups lack sufficient influence. That is, they must
be able to distinguish between groups that enjoy enough policy success, given their size and type, and groups that do not. And this is not
always an easy task. As one lower court has complained, the
powerlessness factor “involve[s] a myriad of complex and interrelated
considerations of a kind not readily susceptible to judicial factfinding.”252 Or as David Strauss has written, the factor “requires the
Justices to be, in a sense, amateur political scientists. They have to
decide just which groups in American politics are able to form coalitions, and how easily.”253
249 See ELY, supra note 87, at 103 (arguing that judges are “in a position objectively to
assess claims” relating to “majority tyranny”); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group
Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 67 (1991) (noting the
importance of the “comparative question” of whether courts or other actors are better
suited to particular tasks).
250 See infra Parts III–IV.
251 Not surprisingly, these scholars employ definitions of powerlessness that are more
difficult for groups to satisfy, leading to their so-called paradox. See supra Part I.B.
252 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 429 (Conn. 2008); see also
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 297 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“The
kind of variable sociological and political analysis necessary to produce such rankings
[under the history-of-discrimination factor] simply does not lie within the judicial
competence . . . .”); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (warning that “unless the Court can precisely define and constitutionally justify
both the terms and analysis it uses,” the identification of suspect classes will become
incoherent).
253 Strauss, supra note 134, at 1265; see also, e.g., Baker, supra note 119, at 1051; Powell,
supra note 126, at 1091 (“One reasonably may doubt the capacity of courts to . . .
determine which groups—at a given time and place—operate effectively within our
politics.”); Schacter, supra note 77, at 1392.
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This concern cannot be resolved through logical reasoning. Only
data can show that powerlessness, as I conceive of it, can be measured
and then usefully applied. The balance of the Article, then, is devoted
to this demonstration. First, in Part III, I survey the existing political
science literature on group influence. Some of it is quite useful (especially the work on the sway of different income strata), but much of it
either fails to control for group size or studies representation rather
than policy enactment. Next, in Part IV, I carry out my own empirical
analysis of powerlessness. Using newly available data at both the federal and state levels, I am able to operationalize the definition I have
advanced above.254 Together, these Parts establish that, while
powerlessness is a complex concept, it is not impervious to quantification. It thus cannot be dismissed on grounds of unmanageability.
III
EXISTING EMPIRICS
The perfect study, for present purposes, would assess the odds of
a group’s aggregate policy preferences being enacted, while controlling for the group’s size and type. A small subset of the literature
comes close to this ideal, though only with respect to income. This
work finds that the poor are relatively powerless at both the federal
and state levels. Unfortunately, most of the relevant studies are
lacking in several respects. If they examine policy enactment at all,
they tend to consider only a few issues and not to control for group
size. More often, they evaluate representation rather than the passage
of legislation (though, in this case, sometimes holding size constant).255 While not fully applicable for these reasons, this work concludes that racial minorities, women, and gays all lack sufficient
political influence.
Below, then, I summarize the existing scholarship on group
power. I arrange the studies by group type, beginning with classifications already deemed suspicious by the Court (race and gender), proceeding to classifications often urged to be added to the suspect list
(sexual orientation and income), and concluding with a pair of additional categories (age and education). For each study, I discuss its key
findings while also highlighting its limitations.
254

See supra Part II.A.
Another study examines how often different groups of voters cast ballots for losing
candidates at all levels of government. See Zoltan L. Hajnal, Who Loses in American
Democracy? A Count of Votes Demonstrates the Limited Representation of African
Americans, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 37 (2009). It finds that blacks are the group most likely
to support losing candidates. Id. I do not discuss this approach further because it too deals
with an aspect of democracy other than policy enactment.
255
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A. Race
The most important work on different racial groups’ clout has
been carried out by John Griffin and Brian Newman. In their book,
Minority Report,256 and in a series of studies,257 they have investigated
both the likelihood that racial groups’ policy preferences will be
enacted and various aspects of racial representation in Congress.
While their methods do not allow them to capture my notion of
powerlessness, their results are still illuminating.
As to policy enactment, Griffin and Newman used long-running
opinion surveys to determine racial groups’ views on whether federal
spending should increase or decrease in six areas: national defense,
the environment, education, foreign aid, aid to major cities, and the
space program.258 They then compared the groups’ views to the
changes in spending that actually took place.259 This approach is
imperfect because it addresses only a fraction of all federal activity,
fails to control for group size, and overlooks the extent to which the
status quo already reflects groups’ preferences. Nevertheless, it shows
that, on the covered issues, blacks and Hispanics’ opinions are substantially less likely to be heeded than those of whites.260 Spending on
a given item is more apt to decrease when blacks and Hispanics favor
a rise, and more apt to increase when they favor a fall.261 This is probative (though hardly dispositive) evidence that blacks and Hispanics
are relatively powerless.262
As to representation, Griffin and Newman measured racial
groups’ ideologies using another major survey,263 and the positions of
256 JOHN D. GRIFFIN & BRIAN NEWMAN, MINORITY REPORT: EVALUATING POLITICAL
EQUALITY IN AMERICA (2008).
257 See John D. Griffin, When and Why Minority Legislators Matter, 17 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 327 (2014); John D. Griffin & Patrick Flavin, Racial Differences in Information,
Expectations, and Accountability, 69 J. POL. 220 (2007); John D. Griffin & Michael Keane,
Are African Americans Effectively Represented in Congress?, 64 POL. RES. Q. 145 (2011);
John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, The Unequal Representation of Latinos and Whites, 69 J.
POL. 1032 (2007).
258 See GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 256, at 63–64.
259 Id. at 64–69.
260 See id. at 64–67 (discussing blacks’ policy preferences); id. at 67–69 (discussing
Hispanics’ policy preferences).
261 Id. More specifically, blacks are less likely to be “winners” in four of six areas, and
more likely to be “big losers” in three of six areas. Hispanics are less likely to be “winners”
in three of six areas, and more likely to be “big losers” in two of six areas. Id. at 64–68.
262 For a study confirming racial minorities’ lack of policy success in the very different
context of direct democracy, see Hajnal et al., supra note 186, at 162–63 (finding that
blacks, Hispanics, and Asian Americans all are more likely than whites to end up on the
losing side of voter initiatives).
263 See GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 256, at 82–83 (discussing the National
Annenberg Election Survey).
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members of Congress using roll call votes.264 They then estimated the
members’ proximity and responsiveness to their constituents by racial
group, controlling for group size.265 Representation, again, is tied only
loosely to enacted policy, and Griffin and Newman’s size controls
were suboptimal too.266 Their results, though, consistently indicated
that black and Hispanic voters wield less influence over their legislators than do whites. House members and senators are farther ideologically from their minority constituents, irrespective of the racial
makeup of their district or state.267 Similarly, in models including the
population shares of minorities, legislators are markedly less responsive to their views.268 These findings also support (but do not compel)
a conclusion of black and Hispanic powerlessness.
Griffin and Newman ran several more analyses of representation
in which they made no effort to control for racial group size.269
Christopher Ellis has done the same in another study.270 Because
these analyses deviate even further from the ideal approach, I note
only that they too found that blacks and Hispanics are underrepresented relative to whites, and do not dwell further on their
results. (Later in this Part, in the absence of more relevant studies, I
pay closer attention to work lacking any size controls.271)
B. Gender
Griffin, Newman, and Christina Wolbrecht also have authored
the only study on how representation varies by constituents’
264 See id. at 81–82 (discussing W-Nominate scores computed using all non-unanimous
roll call votes).
265 See id. at 96, 104, 107, 109 (presenting charts and models controlling for group size).
266 Rather than include group size as an actual control in their proximity analyses,
Griffin and Newman calculated proximity separately for districts and states in different
racial percentage bands. See id. at 96, 104. They also did not include white population share
in their senator responsiveness model. See id. at 107, tbl.5.4. Their House member
responsiveness model, though, did control properly for group size. See id. at 108–09.
267 See id. at 96 (showing racial gaps in proximity of five to forty points for districts); id.
at 104 (showing racial gaps in proximity of four to twelve points for states).
268 See id. at 107 (finding that black and Hispanic opinions have an impact
indistinguishable from zero on senators’ voting records); id. at 109 (finding that white
opinion has an impact more than twice as large as black or Hispanic opinion on House
members’ voting records).
269 See id. at 85 (senator responsiveness model); id. at 93 (House member proximity
chart); Griffin & Newman, supra note 257, at 1039, tbl.2 (House member proximity
model); see also Griffin & Flavin, supra note 257, at 225–26, tbl.2 (House member
proximity model).
270 See Christopher Ellis, Understanding Economic Biases in Representation: Income,
Resources, and Policy Representation in the 110th House, 65 POL. RES. Q. 938, 943–44
(2012) (examining representation gaps for various groups).
271 See infra Part III.E.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-5\NYU503.txt

November 2015]

unknown

Seq: 49

POLITICAL POWERLESSNESS

5-NOV-15

8:56

1575

gender.272 As in their racial work, they estimated constituentlegislator proximity using survey responses and roll call votes.273 In
addition, they computed constituents’ “win ratio[s]” by comparing
their preferences on specific bills to their legislators’ votes on the
same items.274 These techniques, once more, bear little relevance to
actual policy enactment and do not control explicitly for group size.275
But they show that women are substantially underrepresented relative
to men, in terms of both proximity and win ratios, when their legislators are Republicans or there is a Republican House majority.276 In
contrast, women enjoy a representational advantage (albeit a smaller
one) when their legislators are Democrats or there is a Democratic
House majority.277 These results suggest that women’s political influence is mediated by partisan forces. It waxes when Democrats are
ascendant and wanes when Republicans are the dominant party.
Three further studies by Griffin and Newman have presented
data on gender representation while focusing on other matters. They
found that, relative to men, women are more ideologically distant
from their House members278 and have lower legislative win ratios.279
These disparities, which do not take party into account, are consistent
with the above conclusion that women are sharply underrepresented
by Republicans and mildly overrepresented by Democrats. Modest
overall shortfalls seem to mask wider partisan variations.

272 John D. Griffin et al., A Gender Gap in Policy Representation in the U.S. Congress?,
37 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 35 (2012).
273 See id. at 44–45.
274 Id. at 44 (emphasis omitted).
275 Though they do control for it implicitly since men and women make up about equal
shares of the population. See id. at 37 (“[W]e might also want to know whether two groups
of relatively equal size are represented equally.”).
276 Specifically, women are 0.083 points farther than men from their House member
when represented by a Republican, id. at 51, and 0.012 points farther when there is a
Republican House majority, id. at 50. And women’s win ratio is 3.7 points lower than
men’s when represented by a Republican, id. at 50, and 1.45 points lower when there is a
Republican House majority, id. at 47.
277 Specifically, women are 0.091 points closer than men to their House member when
represented by a Democrat, id. at 51, and 0.009 points closer when there is a Democratic
House majority, id. at 50. And women’s win ratio is 1.7 points higher than men’s when
represented by a Democrat, id. at 51, and 0.8 points higher when there is a Democratic
House majority, id. at 47.
278 See GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 256, at 94 (showing a two-point gap in
ideological proximity by gender); Griffin & Newman, supra note 257, at 1038 (same).
279 See John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Voting Power, Policy Representation, and
Disparities in Voting’s Rewards, 75 J. POL. 52, 57, fig.1 (2013) (showing a win ratio gap by
gender of less than one point).
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C. Sexual Orientation
Next, gays’ policy preferences cannot be ascertained in the same
manner as racial minorities’ or women’s. Their share of the population
is too small for their views to be gauged accurately by most surveys,
especially at subnational levels. It thus is impossible to compare their
opinions directly with actual policy outcomes or legislators’ voting
records.280 But it is possible, as Jeffrey Lax, Justin Phillips, and
Katherine Krimmel have demonstrated, to assess gays’ influence in
other ways.281 These scholars used a cutting-edge technique to estimate the entire public’s views on various gay rights issues: adoption,
marriage, military service, anti-discrimination legislation, and so on.282
They then paired these views with policy outcomes at the state level
and Congress members’ votes at the federal level.283 As a result, they
were able to determine how congruent the outcomes and the votes are
with public opinion as a whole.
This approach, of course, suffers from both its lack of data on
gays’ own preferences and its coverage of gay rights issues alone. Nevertheless, it reveals a persistent bias, at both the state and federal
levels, in an anti-gay direction. At the state level, most pro-gay policies do not become likely to be adopted until they are backed by more
than a majority of the population.284 In fact, it typically takes close to
two-thirds support before half of a suite of pro-gay policies are
passed.285 Similarly, at the federal level, most members of Congress
need more than majority support among their constituents before they
become willing to cast a pro-gay vote.286 Of the many instances in
which legislators contravened their constituents’ preferences, fully
280

This is why sexual orientation is not one of the categories I consider in Part IV.
See Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and
Policy Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367 (2009); Katherine L. Krimmel et al.,
Public Opinion and Gay Rights: Do Members of Congress Follow Their Constituents’
Preferences? (Mar. 30, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.columbia.
edu/~jhp2121/workingpapers/kklp_3_30_11.pdf.
282 This technique is multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP), which allows
opinion estimates for geographic subunits to be computed from a single, moderately sized
national survey. See Lax & Phillips, supra note 281, at 371–72; Krimmel et al., supra note
281, at 6–7.
283 See Lax & Phillips, supra note 281, at 372 (pairing views with state policy outcomes);
Krimmel et al., supra note 281, at 7–9 (pairing views with Congress members’ votes).
284 See Lax & Phillips, supra note 281, at 374 (showing logistic regression plots for
various policies); Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States,
56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 148, 156 (2012) (same); id. at 154 (showing that gay rights issues have
the largest and most conservative incongruence bias of any policy area).
285 See Lax & Phillips, supra note 281, at 374 (showing a logistic regression plot for an
index of all eight policies).
286 See Krimmel et al., supra note 281, at 30 (showing logistic regression plots for
various congressional votes).
281
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three-fourths arose due to anti-gay votes when the public favored a
pro-gay stance.287 Consequently, as Lax and Phillips put it, “representative institutions do a poor job protecting [gay] rights even when the
public supports the pro[-gay] position.”288 This is not quite what I
mean by powerlessness, but it is not too far either.
D. Income
Almost exactly what I mean by powerlessness, though, has been
captured by several income group studies. The most significant of
these is Gilens’s 2012 book, Affluence and Influence.289 In it, he compiled answers to more than 2000 survey questions from 1981 to 2006,
all asking whether respondents favored certain policy changes at the
federal level.290 The questions spanned a wide range of topics and
addressed many sorts of shifts to the status quo, in many sorts of ideological directions.291 Gilens then used the answers to estimate the
preferences of respondents at the tenth, fiftieth, and ninetieth income
percentiles on all covered issues.292 Lastly, he painstakingly tracked
whether each policy asked about by a survey actually was adopted by
the federal government during the next four years.293
This approach is well suited to assessing powerlessness because it
examines policy enactment in the aggregate and controls for group
size and type.294 (It is not flawless, though, because the survey questions did not ask respondents about the intensity of their prefer287 See id. at 13 (finding that only 17% of noncongruent roll-call votes were in the liberal
direction).
288 Lax & Phillips, supra note 281, at 383.
289 GILENS, supra note 43. Gilens also addressed these issues, albeit less extensively, in
earlier work. See Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB.
OPINION Q. 778 (2005). And he has continued to probe them since publishing Affluence
and Influence. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564 (2014).
290 See GILENS, supra note 43, at 57–60.
291 In Gilens’s database, the questions are sorted into the following categories: budget,
campaign finance, civil rights, defense, economy and labor, education, environment,
foreign policy, government reform, guns, health, immigration, race, religion, social welfare,
taxation, terrorism, and welfare. Because the questions all ask about policy changes, a
group may appear weak if it is largely content with the status quo but prefers a policy that
fails to be enacted. On the other hand, such a group may appear strong if it opposes a
policy that ultimately does not become law. A more sophisticated survey might ignore the
status quo and simply ask whether various potential policies are favored. The answers then
could be compared with the policies actually in effect.
292 See id. at 61–62.
293 See id. at 62–66.
294 The group type is income, of course, and each income percentile captures a
particular spot in the income distribution, with equal numbers of people located below the
tenth percentile and above the ninetieth percentile.
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ences.295) The method also produces some fairly startling results. With
respect to issues on which income groups disagree, federal policy outcomes are highly responsive to the views of respondents at the ninetieth percentile. As their support for a given measure increases, the
likelihood of the measure’s adoption increases steadily as well.296 But
federal policy outcomes are entirely non-responsive to the views of
respondents at the tenth or fiftieth percentiles.297 In Gilens’s words,
“when preferences between the well-off and the poor [or middle-class]
diverge, government policy bears absolutely no relationship to the
degree of support or opposition among the poor [or middle-class].”298
Gilens’s findings at the federal level have been extended to the
states by Patrick Flavin299 and Elizabeth Rigby and Gerald Wright.300
These scholars used survey data to determine income groups’ policy
preferences in the aggregate, in Flavin’s case,301 and split into economic and social subsets in Rigby and Wright’s.302 They also obtained
policy outcome information from databases assembled by Sorens and
others (again, in the aggregate, in Flavin’s case,303 and subdivided economically and socially in Rigby and Wright’s304). Lastly, they ran
models with policy outcomes as the dependent variables and income
groups’ preferences as the key independent variables, controlling
explicitly for group size.305
This methodology is near optimal from this Article’s perspective
(though it too does not take preference intensity into account
directly). And it shows that the poor have next to no influence over
state policy either. In all of Flavin’s models, spanning three databases
and two eras, the preferences of the low-income group have an impact
295 The questions also often did not provide as much information as one might like
about links or tradeoffs with other policies. However, they did take preference intensity
into account indirectly in that they asked about salient issues more frequently. See id. at
58–59.
296 Specifically, as the share of respondents at the ninetieth percentile favoring a policy
rises from 10% to 90%, the odds of the policy’s enactment rise from 10% to 50%. Id. at 80,
fig.3.5.
297 For respondents at both of these percentiles, the odds of a policy’s enactment stay
constant at about 30% no matter what share of the respondents support the policy. Id.
298 Id. at 81.
299 See Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the American
States, 40 AM. POL. RES. 29 (2012).
300 See Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Whose Statehouse Democracy? Policy
Responsiveness to Poor Versus Rich Constituents in Poor Versus Rich States, in WHO GETS
REPRESENTED 189 (Peter K. Enns & Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011).
301 See Flavin, supra note 299, at 35–37.
302 See Rigby & Wright, supra note 300, at 194–95.
303 See Flavin, supra note 299, at 40, 43.
304 See Rigby & Wright, supra note 300, at 195, 199.
305 See Rigby & Wright, supra note 300, at 207; Flavin, supra note 299, at 41.
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indistinguishable from zero on aggregate policy outcomes (compared
to significant impacts for middle- and high-income preferences).306
Similarly, in three out of Rigby and Wright’s four models, the views of
the low-income group have no effect on state economic or social
policy (while middle- and high-income opinions have a substantial
effect).307 These results, in conjunction with Gilens’s, are a clear sign
that powerlessness can be quantified—and that, if any group is powerless, it is the poor.
Several additional studies have tackled differential representation
by income group (most notably Larry Bartels’s 2008 book, Unequal
Democracy, which launched this field of inquiry).308 Their findings are
that both House members and senators are more ideologically distant
from, and less ideologically responsive to, their low-income constituents.309 Since this work does not relate directly to policy enactment, I
do not discuss it further, except to point out its consistency with the
more relevant literature.
E. Other
Two final classifications, age and education, have not yet been the
subjects of full-length treatments, but have been addressed in passing
by a number of studies. As to age, Griffin and Newman found that
respondents under thirty-five are farther ideologically from their
House members than respondents over fifty-five.310 Similarly, as to
education, Ellis, Griffin, and Newman found that respondents with a
high school diploma are farther ideologically from their House members, and have lower legislative win ratios, than respondents with a
306

Flavin, supra note 299, at 42 tbl.1.
Rigby & Wright, supra note 300, at 208–09 tbl.7.5, 213–14 tbl.7.6. The one exception
is the model for social policy in 2004, in which the views of the middle-income group have
the least influence. Id. at 214.
308 LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
NEW GILDED AGE (2008).
309 See, e.g., id. at 259–62; Christopher Ellis, Social Context and Economic Biases in
Representation, 75 J. POL. 773, 779 (2013); Ellis, supra note 270, at 943; Ross & Li, supra
note 55 (manuscript at 40–41) (finding no link between the share of poor in a House
district and a House member’s likelihood of supporting pro-poor legislation); Jesse H.
Rhodes & Brian F. Schaffner, Economic Inequality and Representation in the U.S. House:
A New Approach Using Population-Level Data 29 fig.7 (Apr. 7, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://people.umass.edu/schaffne/Schaffner.Rhodes.MPSA.2013.
pdf; Chris Tausanovitch, Income and Representation in the United States Congress 22 tbl.1
(2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.christausanovitch.com/
IncomeRepresentation2013.pdf.
I discuss this work in more detail in Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign
Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1468–74 (2015).
310 See GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 256, at 94 (showing an eight-point proximity
gap between these groups); Griffin & Newman, supra note 257, at 1038 (same).
307
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college degree.311 Once again, these are analyses of representation
rather than enacted policy, which fail to control for group size to boot.
But they still imply that the young and the uneducated have less political sway than the old and the educated.
To conclude, then, the existing scholarship on group influence is
suggestive but only partially applicable. Substantively, it hints that
racial minorities, women, gays, the poor, the young, and the uneducated may be relatively powerless in my sense of the term. But methodologically, none of these intimations can be taken too seriously—
except as to the poor—because they arise from studies that are flawed
in one respect or another. In the next Part, I try to rectify these shortcomings. I borrow the best available techniques from the income
group literature, and then apply them to a host of additional classifications and datasets. The result, in my view, is the strongest proof to
date that powerlessness is amenable to measurement and application.
IV
NEW EMPIRICS
I carry out my empirical analysis at both the federal and state
levels.312 At the federal level, I use Gilens’s database of survey
responses and policy outcomes, and I largely replicate his work—only
for groups defined not just by income, but also by race, gender, and
religion. I find that whites’ preferences are more likely to be adopted
by the national government than blacks’ and Hispanics’; that men’s
views are more impactful than women’s; and that all denominations’
opinions are about equally influential.
At the state level, I gauge voters’ preferences using exit polls
from 2000 to 2010, and enacted policy using an index constructed by
Sorens. I then run the same models that have gained wide acceptance
in the income group literature, including interactions between group
opinion and group size as well as additional group size controls. I
again find that state policy is more responsive to the views of whites
and men, respectively, than to those of racial minorities and women. I
also find that state policy is more responsive to the wealthy and the
middle-class than to the poor, and to urban and suburban residents
than to rural dwellers. But there do not seem to be significant differences in responsiveness by age, education, or religion group.
311 See GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 256, at 94 (showing a four-point proximity gap
between these groups); Griffin & Newman, supra note 257, at 1038 (same); see also Ellis,
supra note 270, at 944 (showing a two-point ideological distance gap and a one-point win
ratio gap between these groups).
312 All regression results are in the Appendix.
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That there exist models tailored to measuring powerlessness is
evidence of the concept’s workability. Still more encouraging, in this
regard, is the consistency of the federal and state findings despite their
use of completely different data. As a doctrinal matter, the results suggest that racial minorities and women should keep their suspect status
because they remain relatively powerless.313 Analogously, no age or
education group appears so weak that heightened judicial protection
should be extended to it. But there is a strong clout-based case for
suspect status for the poor and for rural dwellers, both of whom lack
sufficient sway relative to other income and residence groups. And
there also is reason to reconsider the extra judicial attention afforded
to religious minorities, none of which is particularly impotent.
A. Federal Level
As noted earlier, Gilens’s remarkable database includes information on different income groups’ preferences on more than two thousand issues from 1981 to 2006.314 Gilens used this information, along
with records of whether the policies referred to by the surveys in fact
were enacted, to conduct his income group analysis.315 But his
database sheds light on more than income groups’ views. Each entry
also specifies how many respondents of each race, gender, and
religion favored the policy, and how many opposed it.316 These tallies
allowed me to compute, for each policy, the level of support of each
race, gender, and religion group.317
With these estimates in hand, I proceeded to run slightly adapted
versions of Gilens’s models. Like Gilens, I used as my dependent variable whether a policy was adopted by the federal government during
the four years following a survey.318 Also like Gilens, I examined two
groups at a time, considered only issues on which their preferences
diverged by at least ten percentage points, and was unable to adjust
313 Though, as explained later, the case for blacks remaining a suspect class is stronger
than the case for Hispanics. See infra Part IV.C.
314 See supra notes 289–98 and accompanying text.
315 See GILENS, supra note 43, at 60–61.
316 Gilens’s database is on file with the author. Each entry also states how many
respondents answered “don’t know.” I omit these responses from my analysis. The
database further breaks down respondents by region of the country and by union
membership. Because these are not classifications that have been urged to be made
suspect, I do not consider them further.
317 I simply divided the number of each group’s respondents favoring a given policy by
the total number of the group’s respondents favoring or opposing the policy. For example,
if 300 blacks favored a particular policy and 200 opposed it, black support for the policy
was 60%.
318 See GILENS, supra note 43, at 73–77. In sum, about one-third of the policies in the
database were enacted in this timeframe. See id. at 62–63.
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for preference intensity.319 But, unlike Gilens, I controlled explicitly
for group size in all of my models.320 For each group, I included an
interaction term multiplying its support level by its share of the population, as well as its population share separately.321 This is the
approach recommended by Flavin,322 Rigby and Wright,323 and several other political scientists.324 It weights each group’s preferences by
its size, while leaving open the possibility that group size may have an
independent effect on policy enactment. It thus permits very nearly
my conception of powerlessness to be quantified.
319 See id. at 77–85. Only two groups at a time can be examined since it is the groups’
opinion differences that determine which issues will be included in the analysis in the first
place. And Gilens’s rationale for focusing on issues on which groups disagree is that,
otherwise, a group may appear influential simply because it agrees with the group that
actually shapes policy. See id. at 78. Under my conception of group power, it arguably is
irrelevant that a group’s preferences may have been heeded only because they overlapped
with those of another group. See supra Part II.A. Nevertheless, I adopt Gilens’s approach
here for the sake of comparability with his landmark work. It also makes little substantive
difference whether only issues on which groups disagree, or all issues, are included in the
analysis. Either way the results for different groups’ clout are extremely similar.
320 As noted earlier, Gilens controlled implicitly for group size. See supra note 294.
Gilens’s database also did not include population share information for any groups.
I obtained data on race from Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensal/national/nat2010.html (last visited June 7, 2015),
and Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by
Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United States, Regions,
Divisions, and States (U.S. Census Bureau Population Division, Working Paper No. 56,
2002), available at http://mapmaker.rutgers.edu/REFERENCE/Hist_Pop_stats.pdf; data on
gender from Population Estimates, supra, and FRANK HOBBS & NICOLE STOOPS, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 49–67 (2002), https://
www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf; and data on religion from Subject Index, GEN.
SOC. SURVEY, http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website/Browse+GSS+Variables/Subject+Index/
(last visited June 7, 2015) (follow hyperlinks to “R,” “Religion,” “R’s Religious
Preference. . .”, “Respondent (current),” “RS RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE,” and “Click
here to see Trends for RELIG”). Of course, these controls only capture temporal variation
in group size, which is substantial but not overwhelming over the twenty-five year period in
question.
321 More formally, each model I ran was a logit regression of the form: P = b0 + b1
(pg1sg1) + b2 (pg2sg2) + b3sg1 + b4sg2 + e. P indicates whether each policy was enacted within
four years of the survey that asked about it, p is a group’s level of support for a policy, and
s is a group’s share of the population. It also would be reasonable to include group
preference (that is, p) separately in the model. However, the existing literature has not
done so, see sources cited infra note 324, and I do not either for the sake of comparability.
But in results not reported here, I find that it makes little substantive difference whether
group preference is included separately in the specification.
322 See Flavin, supra note 299, at 41 (specifying the same models as those used here).
323 See Rigby & Wright, supra note 300, at 207 (specifying the same models as those
used here).
324 See, e.g., Yosef Bhatti & Robert S. Erikson, How Poorly Are the Poor Represented in
the U.S. Senate? (specifying the same models as those used here and explaining that
groups’ population shares must be included separately in models to avoid odd results), in
WHO GETS REPRESENTED, supra note 300, at 223, 230; Tausanovitch, supra note 309, at 11
(specifying the same models as those used here).
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Beginning with race, I ran separate models for whites and blacks,
and whites and Hispanics. (There were too few Asian American
respondents in most surveys for their views to be determined accurately.325) In the white and black model, first, the coefficient for white
policy support (weighted by white population share) is positive and
statistically significant.326 This indicates that, as white support for a
policy increases, the odds of the policy’s enactment increase as well.
On the other hand, the coefficient for black policy support (weighted
by black population share) is negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero.327 This means that, as black support for a policy rises,
the likelihood of the policy’s adoption stays constant at best, and in
fact may decline somewhat.
These results are illustrated graphically in Figure 1’s first panel.
The chart shows how the odds of policy enactment change as white
support and black support for a policy vary from 0% to 100%, holding
all other variables at their means.328 As white support increases from
0% to 100%, the likelihood of adoption increases from about 10% to
about 60%. As black support rises from 0% to 100%, though, the
odds of enactment fall from roughly 40% to roughly 30%. Federal
policy outcomes thus are highly responsive to the preferences of
whites, but wholly non-responsive (or even negatively responsive) to
those of blacks.
The white and Hispanic model yields similar outputs. Again, the
coefficient for size-weighted white policy support is positive and statistically significant.329 And again, the coefficient for size-weighted Hispanic policy support is statistically indistinguishable from zero.330 As
shown in Figure 1’s second panel, the odds of policy enactment
increase from about 10% to about 55% as white support rises from
325 The median survey included only 10 Asian American respondents, compared to 862
whites, 105 blacks, and 55 Hispanics.
326 See infra Table 1. I only discuss the coefficients for size-weighted policy support
because the coefficients for group size, which represent its impact on the likelihood of
policy adoption when group policy support is zero, are not substantively interesting. Cf.
Bear F. Braumoeller, Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms, 58 INT’L
ORG. 807, 807–11 (2004) (noting the difficulty of interpreting lower-order coefficients in a
model with an interaction term).
327 See infra Table 1. The coefficient actually is significant at the 10% level, but I use the
customary 5% threshold here. A Wald test confirms that the coefficients for white and
black policy support are different (p=0.01).
328 It is not possible to produce this chart with size-weighted policy support (i.e., the
interaction term in the models) on the x-axis. This is because group size cannot be held
constant at its mean as size-weighted policy support varies. Group size obviously is part of
the interaction term.
329 See infra Table 1.
330 See infra Table 1. However, a Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients for white and Hispanic policy support are different (p=0.45).
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0% to 100%. But the likelihood of adoption holds steady at roughly
30% as Hispanic support varies over the same range. Hispanics therefore have little sway over federal policy either, in contrast to the considerable influence enjoyed by whites.
Second, for gender, I ran a single model for men and women. The
coefficient for size-weighted male policy support is positive and statistically significant.331 Conversely, the coefficient for size-weighted
female policy support is negative and significant.332 The inference that
federal policy is positively responsive to men’s preferences, but negatively responsive to women’s, is confirmed by Figure 1’s third panel.
As male support increases from 0% to 100%, the odds of policy enactment rise from about 0% to about 90%. But as female support varies
over the same range, the likelihood of adoption falls from roughly
80% to roughly 10%. When men and women disagree, then, stronger
female backing for a policy seems entirely futile.
Third, for religion, I ran separate models for Protestants and
Catholics, and Protestants and non-religious people. (Many surveys
also identified Jewish respondents, but their numbers usually were too
small for their opinion estimates to be reliable.333) In the Protestant
and Catholic model, there are few cases in which the groups’ preferences diverge by more than ten points,334 and neither coefficient for
size-weighted policy support is statistically significant.335 Not surprisingly, Figure 1’s fourth panel paints a blurry picture too. The odds of
policy enactment barely budge as Protestant support increases from
0% to 100%, and they decline as Catholic support varies over the
same range. At least over this small set of cases, neither denomination
appears especially influential.
Nor, over a somewhat larger sample size,336 do Protestants or
non-religious people. In the model for these groups, neither coefficient for size-weighted policy support rises to the level of statistical
331 See infra Table 1. Female population share is omitted from the model because it is
perfectly collinear with male population share.
332 See infra Table 1. A Wald test confirms that the coefficients for male and female
policy support are different (p=0.00).
333 The median survey included only 9 Jewish respondents, compared to 283 Protestants,
134 Catholics, and 30 non-religious people.
334 Specifically, there are 46 such cases out of the 903 surveys that include information
on both Protestants’ and Catholics’ preferences. See infra Table 1. The regression results in
the Appendix provide the sample size for each model.
335 See infra Table 1. Predictably, a Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients for Protestant and Catholic policy support are different (p=0.44).
336 There are 297 cases in which Protestants’ and non-religious people’s views diverge by
at least ten points. See infra Table 1.
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FIGURE 1. PREDICTED LIKELIHOOD OF FEDERAL POLICY CHANGE
VERSUS GROUP SUPPORT FOR POLICY CHANGE
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significance.337 Similarly, in Figure 1’s fifth panel, the likelihood of
policy adoption increases only modestly, from about 25% to about
45%, as Protestant support rises from 0% to 100%. And the odds of
enactment are even less responsive to non-religious people’s views,
increasing from roughly 30% to roughly 40% as their support varies
over the same range.
Lastly, I updated Gilens’s income group analysis by including
surveys up to 2006 (rather than 2002).338 Like Gilens, I did not control
explicitly for group size, since each income percentile is always at the
same spot in the distribution.339 And like Gilens, I ran separate
models for the tenth and ninetieth income percentiles, and the fiftieth
and ninetieth income percentiles.340 In the first of these models, the
coefficient for policy support at the ninetieth percentile is positive and
statistically significant, while the coefficient for policy support at the
tenth percentile is negative and significant.341 Consistent with this
finding, Figure 1’s sixth panel shows that, as support at the ninetieth
percentile increases from 0% to 100%, the odds of policy enactment
rise from about 10% to about 70%. But as support at the tenth percentile varies over the same range, the likelihood falls from roughly
50% to roughly 20%.
The results of the model for the fiftieth and ninetieth income percentiles are largely equivalent. The coefficient for policy support at
the ninetieth percentile again is positive and statistically significant.342
This time, though, the coefficient for policy support at the fiftieth percentile is negative, but just below the threshold for statistical significance.343 In Figure 1’s seventh panel, the odds of policy enactment
increase from about 10% to about 70% as support at the ninetieth
percentile rises from 0% to 100%. But the likelihood declines from
roughly 50% to roughly 20% as support at the fiftieth percentile
varies over the same range. This chart is virtually identical to the one
for the tenth and ninetieth income percentiles.344
337 See infra Table 1. Again, a Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients
for Protestant and secular policy support are different (p=0.85).
338 See GILENS, supra note 43, at 255 (including only surveys up to 2002 in income group
analysis).
339 See supra notes 294, 320, and accompanying text.
340 See GILENS, supra note 43, at 254–55.
341 See infra Table 1. A Wald test confirms that the coefficients for tenth and ninetieth
percentile policy support are different (p=0.00).
342 See infra Table 1.
343 It is significant at the 10% level but not at the 5% level. See infra Table 1. Again, a
Wald test confirms that the coefficients for fiftieth and ninetieth percentile policy support
are different (p=0.00).
344 In Gilens’s analogous charts, federal policy appears non-responsive rather than
negatively responsive to the preferences of the tenth and fiftieth income percentiles. See
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Gilens’s database, then, is extremely useful because it allows
group power to be assessed at the federal level, considering policy in
the aggregate and controlling for group size and type. But the federal
level is not the only one in our complicated system. It remains possible
that a group that is powerless as to national policy wields significant
influence as to state policy, or vice versa. And how a group fares as to
state policy matters legally. If an overarching determination of
powerlessness is to be made for each group, taking into account clout
at each governmental level, then the states cannot be ignored.345 This
is why I turn to them next.
B. State Level
In the last few years, scholars have deployed a new technique to
estimate public opinion in the states using national surveys.346 Unfortunately, this procedure has been carried out for fewer than fifty individual issues, compared to the more than two thousand in Gilens’s
database.347 Also regrettably, the procedure has been used primarily
to determine the views of state populations in their entirety.348 The
opinions of state subgroups rarely have been calculated—and, indeed,
usually cannot be calculated because of the relatively small sample
sizes of most national surveys.349 It thus is impossible, at present, to
GILENS, supra note 43, at 80. The likely explanation for the disparity is that Gilens did not
hold all other variables at their means as he varied each group’s policy support. Instead, he
simply plotted predicted probability of policy change versus percent favoring change for
each group. See id.
345 See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
346 This technique, again, is MRP. See supra note 282 and accompanying text; see also,
e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, The Geography of Racial
Stereotyping: Evidence and Implications for VRA Preclearance After Shelby County, 102
CALIF. L. REV. 1123, 1156–59 (2014); Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw,
Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities, 75 J.
POL. 330, 333–36 (2013).
347 See Lax & Phillips, supra note 284, at 150, 154 tbl.2 (estimating state public opinion
on thirty-nine policies in the largest study of its kind).
348 The procedure also has been used to determine the views of district and city
populations, again in their entirety. See Krimmel et al., supra note 281, at 6 (congressional
districts); Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 346, at 334 (cities and districts). But see
Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the VRA
After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 51, 55–56),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2414652 (calculating ideal
points for white, black, Hispanic, and Asian respondents by county); Elmendorf & Spencer,
supra note 346, at 1160–63 (calculating levels of anti-black stereotyping for non-black
respondents by state and county).
349 Even scholars who have had access to very large national surveys typically have
collapsed respondents’ individual answers into a single left-right ideological dimension.
See, e.g., Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 346, at 332.
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repeat Gilens’s analysis at the state level. The necessary data on subgroups’ preferences by issue simply does not exist.
In the absence of issue-specific data, I obtained access to the general election exit polls collected by the Roper Center for Public
Opinion Research.350 These polls are conducted in most states every
two years, and they have a number of properties that make them wellsuited to the estimation of subgroups’ views. First, their collective
sample size is enormous. The 208 polls that I used for this study, spanning the 2000–2010 period, had a total of more than 300,000 respondents.351 Second, unlike most national surveys, exit polls are designed
to have representative samples at the state level.352 Their whole point,
after all, is to appraise accurately the states’ respective political environments. Third, all of the exit polls in this period asked respondents
about their ideologies. Specifically, they posed the question, “On most
political matters, do you consider yourself: Liberal, Moderate, or Conservative?” This question is not as fine-grained as one might like,353
but its ubiquity compensates for its bluntness. And fourth, by probing
general beliefs rather than individual policies, the polls largely
avoided the problem of preference intensity. While it is reasonable
(though not yet feasible) to weight issues by how much respondents
350 Exit Poll Database, supra note 45. My thanks to the Roper Center for granting me
access to these polls. I did not use primary exit polls because their respondents are
representative of the primary rather than the general electorate. And I did not use national
election day exit polls because their respondents are representative of the country as a
whole, not of individual states. Moreover, the national exit poll is compiled from
respondents to the state exit polls, so using it would have meant double-counting these
people.
351 Cf. Barbara Norrander & Sylvia Manzano, Minority Group Opinion in the U.S.
States, 10 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 446, 452 (2010) (assembling a database of more than
300,000 respondents using 1996–2006 exit polls); Julianna Pacheco, Using National Surveys
to Measure Dynamic U.S. State Public Opinion: A Guideline for Scholars and an
Application, 11 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 415, 430 (2011) (“State exit polls overcome the
measurement challenges of national surveys by . . . typically interviewing hundreds of state
residents, regardless of state size . . . .”).
Norrander graciously provided me with equivalent data from the 1996–2008 period.
Using it in all of my models instead of the 2000–2010 data made essentially no substantive
difference. The robustness of the results to data from different (albeit overlapping) periods
is highly encouraging.
352 See Norrander & Manzano, supra note 351, at 453–54 (discussing the elaborate
procedures used to ensure the representativeness of state exit polls’ respondents).
Norrander and Manzano criticize Griffin and Newman for estimating state subgroups’
views using national surveys whose state samples likely were unrepresentative. See id. at
452. They also argue that the disaggregation of exit poll data is superior to the application
of MRP to national surveys, due in part to the greater sensitivity of the former approach to
differences among states. See id. at 452–53.
353 In contrast, the National Annenberg Election Survey used a five-point ideology
scale, see GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 256, at 41, and the American National Election
Study used a seven-point scale, see Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 324, at 226.
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care about them,354 it would seem to violate basic egalitarian norms to
weight people differently based on the strength of their ideologies.
After amassing this vast pool of exit poll respondents, I computed
their average ideologies by state and then by subgroup.355 Following
the lead of other scholars, I assigned values of 1 to “Liberal” answers,
0 to “Moderate” answers, and -1 to “Conservative” answers.356 For
classifications, I used both the four that I covered in my federal analysis (race, gender, religion, and income) and three additional ones
(age, education, and residence).357 While other works have estimated
racial and income group ideology by state,358 this is the first study to
tackle the remaining categories.
With respect to enacted policy, information does exist on each
state’s laws on a host of topics. The database compiled by Sorens, in
particular, lists each state’s policy in more than 200 areas (updated
biannually to boot).359 This material is overkill for present purposes,
since equally detailed public opinion data is unavailable. Fortunately,
though, Sorens used principal components analysis to collapse all of
the individual policies into a single index of state policy liberalism.360
Positive scores on this measure indicate state policy that is more liberal overall, while negative scores denote the opposite.361 The measure also correlates highly with indices of aggregate state policy

354

See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
As recommended both by scholars and by the organization conducting the polls, I
incorporated the respondents’ weights into all of my calculations. See Norrander &
Manzano, supra note 351, at 478 n.3. I also derived subgroups’ population shares directly
from the exit poll data. This means the shares represent subgroups’ proportions of the
electorate rather than the general population. See id. at 455.
356 See Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 324, at 236; Norrander & Manzano, supra note 351,
at 454. These scholars actually assigned values of -1 to “Liberal” answers and 1 to
“Conservative” answers, but I reversed the signs in order to obtain the same ideological
orientation as the Sorens index of state policy liberalism.
357 Gilens’s database does not include residence data, and its age and education data is
not interpretable without access to the original surveys.
358 See supra Parts III.A, III.D (discussing the relevant literature).
359 Sorens Database, supra note 46 (covering 222 policy areas); see also Jason Sorens et
al., U.S. State and Local Public Policies in 2006: A New Database, 8 STATE POL. & POL’Y
Q. 309, 311–17 (2008) (describing the compilation of the database).
360 See Sorens et al., supra note 359, at 319–21. They also created a measure of state
policy urbanism, which I do not consider further because its substantive meaning is
unclear, see id. at 322, 324, and because it correlates poorly with other scholars’ indices. In
addition, I use each state’s average policy liberalism over the entire 2000–2010 period
covered by the database. See Sorens Database, supra note 46.
361 See id. Average scores over the 2000–2010 period range from -6.4 (Wyoming) to 12.8
(California), with a mean of 0.0 (roughly Oregon).
355
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created by other scholars.362 I thus felt comfortable making it the
dependent variable in all of my state-level models.
In these models, I used exactly the same specification as Flavin,
Rigby and Wright, and several other political scientists.363 That is, I
interacted each subgroup’s average ideology with its share of the population, while also including population share separately so as to allow
it to influence policy liberalism independently.364 Unlike in my federal
analysis, though, I ran a single model for each classification rather
than for each subgroup pair, and I considered all cases rather than just
those where subgroups’ ideologies diverged.365 I did so in part for the
sake of consistency with the existing literature,366 and in part to avoid
discarding valuable data. With a universe of just fifty states, validity
concerns would mount if numerous jurisdictions were excluded. The
consequence of these choices is a bias against findings of statistical
significance. As Ellis and Joseph Ura have noted, standard errors tend
to be inflated when policy models include subgroups with similar ideologies.367 Accordingly, any significant findings that do emerge should
be seen as relatively robust.
Beginning with the model for race, the coefficient for white ideology (weighted by white population share) is positive and statistically
362 See Sorens et al., supra note 359, at 320 (noting correlations of 0.81 and -0.76 with
other scholars’ indices); see also Devin Caughey & Christopher Warshaw, Dynamic
Representation in the American States, 1960–2012, at 18 fig.2 (MIT Political Science
Department, Research Paper No. 2014-22, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2455441 (noting a correlation of 0.84 between their index and that of Sorens et
al.).
363 See supra notes 322–24 and accompanying text (describing this specification).
364 More formally, each model I ran was an OLS regression of the form: L = b0 + b1
(pg1sg1) + b2 (pg2sg2) + . . . + bn (pgnsgn) + bn+1sg1 + bn+2sg2 + . . . + b2nsgn + e. L is a state’s
overall policy liberalism, p is a subgroup’s average ideology, and s is a subgroup’s share of
the electorate. As in the federal analysis, it also would be reasonable to include subgroup
ideology (that is, p) separately in the model. But, as before, the existing literature has not
done so, and doing so makes little substantive difference.
365 See supra note 319 and accompanying text (describing the methods used in the
federal analysis).
366 Notably, neither Flavin nor Rigby and Wright omitted states where different income
groups’ views were too similar. These scholars also considered all income groups together,
not in pairs. See Flavin, supra note 299, at 42 tbl.1; Rigby & Wright, supra note 300, at
208–09 tbl.7.5, 213–14 tbl.7.6.
367 Joseph Daniel Ura & Christopher R. Ellis, Income, Preferences, and the Dynamics of
Policy Responsiveness, 4 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 785, 790 (2008) (“[S]tandard errors become
inflated when . . . correlated series are included as predictors simultaneously . . . .”); see
also GILENS, supra note 43, at 253; Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 324, at 235 (explaining
that when groups’ ideologies are “more internally correlated,” “[t]his results in higher
multicollinearity and thus higher standard errors”). Because of the similar ideologies of
many of the subgroups (and because of their sheer number), I do not report Wald tests in
this Part.
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significant.368 This indicates that, as whites become more liberal from
one state to another, overall state policy also becomes more liberal.
On the other hand, the coefficient for black ideology (weighted by
black population share) is statistically indistinguishable from zero.369
This means that, as blacks become more liberal from one state to
another, overall state policy does not change appreciably. The coefficient for size-weighted Hispanic ideology is positive and statistically
significant as well.370 As Hispanics become more liberal from state to
state, overall state policy does so too.
Figure 2’s first panel provides more information on responsiveness by racial group. The chart shows how state policy liberalism
changes as white ideology, black ideology, and Hispanic ideology vary
from the tenth to the ninetieth percentiles of their respective distributions, holding all other variables at their means.371 As white ideology
shifts over this range, state policy liberalism is highly responsive, going
from about -4 (or roughly Alabama’s policy set) to about 4 (or
roughly Michigan’s). But as black ideology varies over this span, state
policy liberalism moves only from about -1 (or roughly Alaska’s policy
set) to about 1 (or roughly Ohio’s). And as Hispanic ideology goes
from its tenth to its ninetieth percentile, state policy liberalism
changes only from about -2 (or roughly Louisiana’s policy set) to
about 2 (or roughly Maine’s).
Second, in the model for gender, the coefficient for size-weighted
male ideology is positive and statistically significant.372 Conversely,
the coefficient for size-weighted female ideology is negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero.373 The inference that state policy is
368 See infra Table 2. As in the federal analysis, I omitted Asian Americans because their
numbers were too small for reliable ideology estimates to be produced. The median
number of Asian American respondents per state was just 48, compared to 4673 for whites,
392 for blacks, and 136 for Hispanics. Also as in the federal analysis, I only discuss the
coefficients for size-weighted ideology because the coefficients for group size, which
represent its impact on state policy liberalism when group ideology is perfectly moderate,
are not substantively interesting. See supra note 326.
369 See infra Table 2.
370 See infra Table 2.
371 I use ideology percentile as the x-axis here, rather than ideology itself, to avoid
having to make large numbers of out-of-sample predictions. In the federal analysis, most
subgroups’ levels of support for individual policies ranged from near 0% to near 100%. As
a result, no heroic assumptions were necessary to estimate the likelihood of policy change
for all levels of policy support. Here, on the other hand, most subgroups’ ideologies vary
from state to state by at most 0.5 points on a 2-point scale. Predictions of state policy
liberalism for ideologies that subgroups never actually hold thus would be highly
unreliable. Cf. GRIFFIN & NEWMAN, supra note 256, at 87 fig.5.2 (displaying the predicted
W-Nominate scores for racial groups’ twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth ideology percentiles).
372 See infra Table 2.
373 See infra Table 2.
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responsive only to men’s preferences is verified by Figure 2’s second
panel. As male ideology varies from its tenth to its ninetieth percentile, state policy liberalism goes from about -5 (or roughly South
Dakota’s policy set) to about 6 (or roughly Illinois’s). But as female
ideology shifts over the same range, state policy liberalism stays
almost perfectly constant at about 0 (or roughly Oregon’s policy set).
Third, in the model for religion, none of the coefficients for sizeweighted ideology rises to the level of statistical significance (though
that for Protestants comes close).374 Figure 2’s third panel confirms
that state policy responsiveness does not differ very much by denomination. The slope for Protestant ideology is somewhat steeper than
the slopes for Catholic ideology and Other Religion ideology, which in
turn are somewhat steeper than the slope for No Religion ideology.375
But these variations in responsiveness are relatively minor—and
markedly smaller than the gaps by race and gender.
Fourth, in the model for income, none of the coefficients for sizeweighted ideology rises to the level of statistical significance either.376
(Though that for respondents earning more than $75,000 per year
barely misses, and that for respondents earning less than $30,000 is
negative.377) In Figure 2’s fourth panel, state policy liberalism goes
from about -2 (or roughly Louisiana’s policy set) to about 3 (or
roughly Delaware’s) as the ideologies of those making more than
$75,000, or between $30,000 and $75,000, shift from their tenth to their
ninetieth percentiles. But state policy liberalism actually decreases
from about 1 (or roughly Ohio’s policy set) to about -1 (or roughly
New Hampshire’s) as the ideology of those making less than $30,000
varies over the same range.
Fifth, in what is becoming a trend, none of the coefficients in the
models for age and education rises to statistical significance.378
(Though, again, one comes close: that for respondents with up to a
high school education.379) Figure 2’s fifth and sixth panels show that
state policy is about equally responsive to the ideologies of most age
and education groups: respondents aged eighteen to twenty-nine,
374 See infra Table 2. Protestant ideology is significant at the 10% level but not at the
5% level.
375 In order to obtain sufficient sample sizes for all denominations, I recoded as
Protestant respondents who identified as Mormon or Other Christian, and as Other
respondents who identified as Jewish or Muslim.
376 See infra Table 2.
377 See infra Table 2. The ideology of respondents earning more than $75,000 per year
has a p-value of 0.059.
378 See infra Table 2.
379 See infra Table 2. The ideology of respondents with up to a high school education is
significant at the 10% level but not at the 5% level.
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FIGURE 2. PREDICTED STATE POLICY LIBERALISM VERSUS GROUP
IDEOLOGY PERCENTILE
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thirty to thirty-nine, forty to forty-nine, and sixty and up, as well as
respondents with up to a high school education, with some college
education, and with a college degree. However, state policy seems to
be negatively (though not significantly) responsive to the ideologies of
respondents aged fifty to fifty-nine, and with a postgraduate degree.
These somewhat unexpected results warrant further investigation.
Lastly, in the model for residence, the coefficients for sizeweighted urban and suburban ideology both are positive and statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficient for size-weighted rural ideology is statistically indistinguishable from zero.380 Figure 2’s seventh
panel supports this account of urban and suburban influence paired
with rural weakness. As urban and suburban ideologies vary from
their tenth to their ninetieth percentiles, state policy liberalism goes
from about -3 (or roughly South Carolina’s policy set) to about 3 (or
roughly Delaware’s). But as rural ideology shifts over the same range,
state policy liberalism holds steady at about 0 (or roughly Oregon’s
policy set).
This concludes what may have seemed, to some readers, like an
unending hail of statistics. Next, I consider what these regression
results and predicted value charts actually tell us about political
powerlessness. I address their implications for both the methodology
of determining powerlessness and the broader substantive question of
which groups should be deemed powerless.
C. Discussion
The most important point about the above analyses is that they
demonstrate that powerlessness, as I define it, is measurable. There
exist models (and data to insert into them) that reveal how responsive
policy outcomes are to different groups’ preferences, controlling for
the groups’ size and type. And these models (and data) do not just
exist. Rather, they have been discussed extensively in the political science literature, which has concluded that they are the proper way to
quantify policy responsiveness by group.381 As I noted earlier, the
exact model specification I used has been employed previously by
Flavin, Rigby and Wright, and several other scholars.382 All of the
380

See infra Table 2.
See supra note 324 and accompanying text. In the first important work on
responsiveness by income group, Bartels did not include groups’ population shares
separately in his models. See BARTELS, supra note 308, at 257–62. Bhatti and Erikson
subsequently pointed out this omission, see Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 324, at 228–30,
and all later studies have used the same specification that I employ.
382 See supra note 322–24 and accompanying text.
381
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data I worked with also has been relied on by prior studies of
responsiveness.383
The second key point is the impressive consistency of the federal
and state analyses, both with each other and with existing work. I
found that blacks are relatively powerless at both the federal and state
levels; so too have Griffin and Newman (at the federal level).384 I also
found that the poor are relatively powerless at both the federal and
state levels; so too have Gilens (at the federal level), as well as Flavin
and Rigby and Wright (at the state level).385 And as for classifications
not yet studied by other scholars,386 my results for gender and religion
were highly compatible as well. Women are relatively powerless at
both the federal and state levels, while no religious group appears
overly weak at either level. This consistency is quite heartening. It
means that powerlessness determinations are robust to the use of
completely different data from completely different jurisdictions.
It is true that the federal and state analyses are not entirely in
sync. Hispanics, for instance, are relatively powerless at the federal
level387 but not at the state level. Similarly, the gap between the influence of the poor and that of other income groups is more glaring at
the federal level.
In my view, these inconsistencies are fairly minor, involving just a
few of the models’ many groups. It also is unclear that they are discrepancies at all. It may well be that in the federal system, with its
malapportioned Senate, filibuster, and very expensive campaigns and
lobbying, Hispanics and the poor have little clout. But they may be
more politically potent in the states, whose institutions typically are
more majoritarian and less costly. Notably, my results for the poor are
almost identical substantively to those of Gilens, Flavin, and Rigby
and Wright.388 This convergence suggests that the poor’s sway does
vary somewhat by governmental level.
383 See GILENS, supra note 43, at 57–69 (discussing his database of group preferences
and federal policy outcomes); Bhatti & Erikson, supra note 324, at 238–40 (using exit poll
data to study senators’ responsiveness); Flavin, supra note 299, at 40–43 (using Sorens’s
data to measure state policy outcomes); Rigby & Wright, supra note 300, at 195, 199,
208–09, 213–14 (same).
384 See supra Part III.A.
385 See supra Part III.D.
386 These classifications, that is, have not yet been studied using an appropriate
methodology. See supra Part III.B (explaining that existing gender studies focus on
representation rather than policy enactment).
387 Though, even at this level, a Wald test fails to distinguish their influence from that of
whites. See supra note 330. Hispanics thus may not be powerless at either level.
388 Like Gilens, I find a large gap in favor of the wealthy at the federal level. See
GILENS, supra note 43, at 79–83. And like Flavin and Rigby and Wright, I find that the
influence of the poor is indistinguishable from zero at the state level, while the middle-class
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It also is true that the state analysis captures my notion of
powerlessness less precisely than its federal counterpart. By aggregating group preferences and policy outcomes from the beginning, the
former abstracts away the details of individual issues. It is cruder than
Gilens’s approach of using particular policies, not whole states, as the
basic unit of study.389 But, while correct, this critique should not be
overstated. Even though it is suboptimal, the state analysis satisfies all
of the criteria of a suitable methodology. It examines enacted policy,
in many areas at once, while controlling for group size and type. It
also avoids the need to adjust for preference intensity by considering
ideologies in their entirety rather than specific agenda items.390 Moreover, it is possible that Gilens’s method soon will be feasible at the
state level. Data on state publics’ issue-specific views is proliferating,
thanks to the emergence of a new estimation technique, and it would
take just a few tweaks to this technique to produce opinion figures for
state subgroups too.391 In the near future, then, state analysis may
require no sacrifice in sophistication.
A final objection relates to judicial capacity. Even if political
scientists can assess group influence accurately, how can courts possibly do so? The very idea of judges running regression models and
creating predicted value charts, in the style of the last two Sections, is
preposterous. Much less far-fetched, though, is the notion of courts
endorsing a definition of powerlessness that hinges on empirical evidence, and then admitting expert testimony that supplies this evidence. In fact, this is exactly how courts have tackled an array of
election law issues: how many people are harmed by a voting restriction,392 what the level of racial polarization is in an area,393 what share
of minority voters is needed so they can elect their preferred candiand the wealthy wield comparable power, which is sometimes but not always statistically
significant. See Flavin, supra note 299, at 42 tbl.1; Rigby & Wright, supra note 300, at
208–09, 213–14.
389 See GILENS, supra note 43, at 50–69.
390 See supra note 354 and accompanying text (noting that it is not yet feasible to weigh
issues by the degree to which respondents care about them).
391 As noted earlier, Lax and Phillips already have produced estimates of state publics’
views on thirty-nine separate issues, see supra note 347, and MRP needs only a few
adjustments at the poststratification stage to generate figures for subgroups rather than
populations in their entirety. See Lax & Phillips, supra note 284, at 150; Krimmel, supra
note 281, at 7. If the large national surveys used by Tausanovitch and Warshaw, see supra
note 349, were paired with the revised MRP procedure, Gilens’s method likely would
become feasible at the state level.
392 This is a crucial issue whenever plaintiffs claim that a franchise restriction amounts to
an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote. See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, 2014 WL
5090258, at *21 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014) (“Several experts were tasked with determining the
number of registered voters who might [be affected by Texas’s photo identification
requirement] . . . .”).
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date,394 and so on. Courts have never tried to answer these questions
on their own. Instead, they have called upon experts to assist them,
and then relied heavily on their contributions. Political powerlessness
doctrine could operate in the same fashion.
Indeed, its operation would be comparatively less taxing for the
judiciary. In other fields, courts must admit, and then grapple with,
expert testimony every time that a certain claim is made. But
powerlessness is not itself a cause of action, but rather a factor that
bears on a group’s suspect status. And a group’s suspect status is fixed
nationally by the Supreme Court, and then revisited only rarely.395 It
is not up for grabs in every lawsuit. Accordingly, courts would need to
evaluate a group’s influence in only a handful of extraordinary cases.
In the vast majority of equal protection litigation, courts would simply
apply the type of scrutiny entailed by a group’s preset status. The
vexing empirics would be irrelevant.
Assume, then, that my definition of powerlessness is manageable,
and that the results I presented earlier are reliable. What would be the
legal implications? Below, I go through the classifications that I covered in the federal and state analyses: race, gender, religion, income,
age, education, and residence. For each, I comment on whether (and
how) current doctrine would have to change if the results were taken
seriously. For the sake of analytical simplicity, I also equate suspect
status and powerlessness here, even though the former obviously is
not solely a function of the latter.396 I further streamline the analysis
by concluding that a group is powerless only if (1) its preferences do
not have a statistically significant impact on policy outcomes at either
the federal or state levels; and (2) the preferences of another group of
the same type do have such an impact.397
393 Racial polarization in voting is one of the three preconditions for liability under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51, 52 n.18
(1986) (plurality opinion).
394 Whether there is a sufficiently large minority population to elect its preferred
candidate is also a precondition for liability under Section 2. See id. at 50.
395 See supra note 206 and accompanying text (recommending that powerlessness be
assessed nationally).
396 See supra notes 208–20 and accompanying text (explaining that it is unclear how the
four suspect class criteria are meant to be analyzed).
397 Unfortunately, I am unable to comment on the classification that has attracted the
most recent attention, homosexuality, because data on gay public opinion is unavailable at
either the federal or state level. I also do not address the intersections of different groups—
for example, black women or wealthy Protestants—due to data and space constraints. See
generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) (discussing structural,
political, and representational intersectionality in the context of violence against women of
color).
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Beginning with race, the legal status of blacks would not have to
change at all. Blacks are a suspect class, at present,398 and they also
are relatively powerless at both the federal and state levels. At both
levels, their views have a much smaller effect on enacted policy than
those of whites.399 Sadly, decades after the struggles of the civil rights
era, blacks continue to require heightened judicial protection. On the
other hand, Hispanics’ need for such protection may be lessening. At
the federal level, the coefficient for Hispanic policy support is indistinguishable from zero, but it also is indistinguishable from the coefficient for white policy support.400 And at the state level, the coefficient
for Hispanic ideology is positive and statistically significant.401 From
these figures, it is difficult to conclude that Hispanics are relatively
powerless in the nation as a whole. At worst, they are weak in
Washington but more potent in the states.
Second, as to gender, the case for women’s suspect status remains
compelling.402 At both the federal and state levels, women’s opinions
exert much less influence than men’s on policy outcomes. At both
levels, in fact, the gaps between male and female clout are the largest
of any groups I analyzed in tandem. This is perhaps the study’s most
surprising and robust finding. Despite their large population share and
the range of laws protecting them from discrimination, women
continue to be alarmingly powerless relative to men.
Third, as to religion, current law seems to treat all denominations
as suspect classes,403 but this treatment may no longer be necessary, at
least for the groups for which data is available. In both the federal and
state models, no coefficient for group preference rises to the level of
statistical significance, indicating that no denomination is particularly
strong or weak. This conclusion is bolstered by the predicted value
398 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (declaring race a suspect
classification).
399 For confirmation of my findings by other scholars (at the federal level), see supra
Part III.A.
400 See supra note 330 (noting the results of a Wald test for Hispanic and white
coefficients). Griffin and Newman also find that the Hispanic-white gap with respect to
congressional representation is substantially smaller than the black-white gap. See GRIFFIN
& NEWMAN, supra note 256, at 87 & fig.5.2, 88 (showing equally steep responsiveness
slopes for whites and Hispanics, in contrast to the much flatter slope for blacks).
401 See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
402 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
(recognizing that the Court subjects gender-based classifications to heightened scrutiny).
403 See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 596 (1895) (Field, J.,
concurring) (declaring, apparently, that religion is a suspect classification), aff’d on reh’g,
157 U.S. 429 (1895), superseded on other grounds by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XVI. Almost no modern equal protection cases involve religious groups,
likely because their claims tend to be adjudicated under the First Amendment—a
provision about which I express no opinion here.
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charts, which show roughly equal slopes for all groups. However, it is
important to note that only Protestants, Catholics, non-religious
people, and a catch-all category were included in the analyses. It still
is possible that smaller sects (such as Jews, Muslims, and Buddhists) or
subgroups of larger traditions (such as evangelical and mainline
Protestants) are relatively powerless.
Fourth, as to income, there is a strong (though not ironclad) argument that courts are wrong not to deem the poor a suspect class.404 At
the federal level, rising policy support at the tenth income percentile
has a negative effect on the odds of policy enactment, suggesting a
startling degree of impotence.405 At the state level too, the coefficient
for low-income ideology is negative and indistinguishable from zero.
At this level, though, the coefficient for high-income ideology just
misses statistical significance, meaning that the gulf between rich and
poor may not be quite as large. In sum, it is fair to say that the poor
are relatively powerless overall, but that their weakness may not be
quite as pronounced in the states.406
Fifth, as to age and education, courts seem to have gotten it about
right. They do not recognize any age or education group as a suspect
class,407 nor should they based on the state analysis. In the age and
education models, no coefficient rises to the level of statistical significance. Similarly, in the predicted value charts, the slopes for most age
and education groups are about the same. The exceptions, as observed
earlier, are respondents aged fifty to fifty-nine and respondents with a
postgraduate degree, whose slopes both are negative (though not significantly so). These results require further study, but, at present, they
do not justify a verdict of powerlessness for either group.
Finally, as to residence, courts have never confronted a claim to
suspect status by any residential group. But if they were faced with
404 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (declining
to recognize the poor as a suspect class). But see Ross & Li, supra note 55 (manuscript at
18–19) (noting that the Court did not squarely confront the suspect status of the poor in
Rodriguez).
405 Like Gilens, I ran models only for the tenth and ninetieth percentiles and the fiftieth
and ninetieth percentiles in Part IV.A. Running the same model for the tenth and fiftieth
percentiles produces the following results: a positive and statistically significant coefficient
for policy support at the fiftieth percentile, and a negative coefficient significant at the 10%
level for policy support at the tenth percentile. These results are almost identical to the
ones from the model for the tenth and ninetieth percentiles, and they indicate that the poor
also are powerless relative to the middle-class.
406 For confirmation of my findings by other scholars (at both the federal and state
levels), see supra Part III.D.
407 See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976) (declining to
recognize the elderly as a suspect class). The Supreme Court has never faced any education
group’s claim to suspect status.
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such a claim by rural inhabitants, they should be receptive to it. In the
relevant state model, the coefficient for rural ideology is indistinguishable from zero, while those for urban and suburban ideology both are
positive and statistically significant. Likewise, in the corresponding
chart, the slope for rural ideology is nearly flat, while those for urban
and suburban ideology are tilted upward. These findings would benefit from confirmation at the federal level, but their upshot is that
rural dwellers are powerless relative to their urban and suburban
neighbors.
All in all, then, current doctrine is consistent with the empirical
evidence in some areas and at odds with it in others. Figure 3 summarizes the points of agreement and dispute. Its vertical axis shows
whether or not courts deem each group powerless (again equating suspect status and powerlessness for present purposes), and its horizontal
axis does the same for this Part’s analyses. The upper-left and lowerright quadrants contain the groups as to which the approaches converge. The doctrine and the empirics concur that blacks and women
are relatively powerless, and that whites, men, the non-poor, all age
groups, all education groups, and the non-rural are not. Conversely,
the lower-left and upper-right quadrants contain the groups as to
which the approaches diverge. Hispanics and religious groups are relatively powerless according to the doctrine but not the empirics. And
the poor and rural dwellers are relatively powerless according to the
empirics but not the doctrine.
Equal protection law thus would look quite—but not completely—different if suspect status were based only on my definition
of powerlessness.408 Nothing would change for most groups, including
blacks and women. But laws discriminating against Hispanics and
religious groups no longer would be subject to more rigorous review,
while laws discriminating against the poor and rural dwellers now
would be. Into which bucket each group falls, though, ultimately is of
secondary importance. The crucial point is that, under my approach,
powerlessness would be analyzed in a theoretically and empirically
defensible manner. A group would be deemed to lack sufficient influence if, and only if, its aggregate policy preferences were less likely to
be enacted than those of similarly sized and classified groups. In the
end, my proposal should rise or fall based on the appeal of this idea—
not the identities of the groups that it benefits or harms.

408 Again, this is a big if, which I am stipulating here only for the sake of analytical
tractability. See supra notes 208–20 and accompanying text (discussing how the various
indicia might be related to the ultimate determination of suspect status).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\90-5\NYU503.txt

November 2015]

unknown

Seq: 75

5-NOV-15

POLITICAL POWERLESSNESS

8:56

1601

FIGURE 3. POWERLESSNESS DETERMINATIONS UNDER CURRENT
LAW AND ACCORDING TO EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
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CONCLUSION
I am not the first to notice the incoherence at the core of the
powerlessness doctrine. Eskridge and Schacter, among others, also
have documented the many conflicting conceptions of influence that
courts have embraced at different times.409 These scholars, though,
have responded to the disorder by calling for the doctrine’s elimination. Eskridge, for instance, has argued that, while powerlessness
“may cast light on the perseverance of prejudice and stereotyping,” it
409 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 54, at 10–19 (tracing the courts’ conflicting
applications of the powerlessness doctrine); Schacter, supra note 77, at 1372–90 (same);
supra note 80 (listing scholars who have criticized powerlessness doctrine for its lack of
clarity).
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should not be a separate criterion for suspect status.410 More dramatically, Schacter has advocated the interment of the theory from which
the doctrine is derived in the first place. In her words, pluralism “lacks
the internal normative apparatus to answer the very question it makes
central—whether a group is sufficiently disadvantaged in the political
process to warrant special judicial solicitude.”411
What distinguishes this project from prior works, then, is that I
have sought to rebuild the powerlessness doctrine, not to reject it. I
have offered a definition of powerlessness that follows directly from
pluralist theory, in that it focuses on the likelihood that a group’s
aggregate policy preferences will be enacted. I also have shown that
this definition can be operationalized using data and models that are
widely accepted by political scientists. My perspective on powerlessness thus is markedly more optimistic than Eskridge and Schacter’s.
They see the doctrine’s failures to date and conclude that it is inherently flawed. To me, in contrast, these shortfalls merely reveal a body
of law that has not yet worked itself pure. Pluralism does not lack the
normative apparatus to determine whether a group is powerless. The
problem is just that its apparatus has not yet been put to good use.

410

Eskridge, supra note 54, at 20.
Schacter, supra note 77, at 1369 (referring to Ely’s political process theory, which
itself is derived, in relevant part, from pluralism).
411
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1. FEDERAL REGRESSION RESULTS

VARIABLES
White
Weighted
Support
White Share
Black
Weighted
Support

(1)
White
vs.
Black

(2)
White
vs.
Hispanic

4.224***

3.226***

(0.747)

(0.731)

-0.953

57.87

(7.480)

(49.29)

(3)
Male vs.
Female

(4)
Protestant
vs.
Catholic

(5)
Protestant
vs.
Secular

0.573

1.946

(6.767)

(1.476)

17.92*

-13.20

(9.236)

(10.28)

-5.808*
(3.483)

Black Share

-72.40
(133.8)

Hispanic
Weighted
Support

-0.452
(4.435)

Hispanic
Share

89.03
(82.92)

Male
Weighted
Support

17.63***

Male Share

-324.1***

(2.782)
(57.66)
Female
Weighted
Support

-9.152***
(1.640)

Protestant
Weighted
Support
Protestant
Share
Catholic
Weighted
Support

-13.39
(12.63)

Catholic
Share

0.830
(33.01)

(6)
50th Pct.
vs. 90th
Pct.

(7)
10th Pct.
vs. 90th
Pct.
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(1)
White
vs.
Black

(2)
White
vs.
Hispanic

(3)
Male vs.
Female

(4)
Protestant
vs.
Catholic

Secular
Weighted
Support

(5)
Protestant
vs.
Secular
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(6)
50th Pct.
vs. 90th
Pct.

(7)
10th Pct.
vs. 90th
Pct.

3.315***

3.404***

(0.996)

(0.543)

3.613
(7.769)

Secular Share

-36.07**
(16.36)

90th
Percentile
Support
50th
Percentile
Support

-1.468*
(0.817)

10th
Percentile
Support

-1.509***
(0.496)

Constant
Observations

7.365

-53.53

155.5***

-10.62

9.797

(21.58)

(44.60)

(28.05)

(10.93)

(7.524)

(0.420)

(0.267)

891

718

427

46

297

388

852

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

-1.845*** -1.808***
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TABLE 2. STATE REGRESSION RESULTS
VARIABLES
White
Weighted
Ideology

(1)
Race

(2)
Gender

(3)
Religion

27.62***
(4.361)

White Share

4.084
(4.608)

Black
Weighted
Ideology

86.28
(57.32)

Black Share

-7.473
(6.852)

Hispanic
Weighted
Ideology

266.0***
(65.00)

Hispanic
Share

-25.16**
(9.357)

Male
Weighted
Ideology

87.46***
(28.98)

Male Share

-15.83
(136.7)

Female
Weighted
Ideology

-0.214
(21.33)

Female Share

-61.99
(148.3)

Protestant
Weighted
Ideology

37.95*
(21.03)

Protestant
Share

1.184
(7.372)

Catholic
Weighted
Ideology

60.72
(36.21)

Catholic
Share

-0.271
(7.851)

Other Rel.
Weighted
Ideology

105.1

(4)
Income

(5)
Age

(6)
(7)
Education Residence
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(1)
Race

(2)
Gender

(3)
Religion

(4)
Income

(5)
Age

(97.28)
Other Rel.
Share

-93.25***
(33.87)

No Rel.
Weighted
Ideology

26.69
(86.52)

No Rel.
Share

33.69
(25.31)

<$30K
Weighted
Ideology

-31.87
(45.94)

<$30K Share

-17.30
(13.80)

$30–75K
Weighted
Ideology

40.63
(28.57)

$30–75K
Share

17.79
(11.34)

>$75K
Weighted
Ideology

44.83*
(23.12)

>$75K Share

-26.49***
(8.861)

18–29
Weighted
Ideology

26.38
(45.24)

18–29 Share

147.0
(233.5)

30–39
Weighted
Ideology

99.29
(66.98)

30–39 Share

98.52
(253.7)

40–49
Weighted
Ideology

78.48
(59.22)

40–49 Share

5-NOV-15

99.59
(239.1)
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(6)
(7)
Education Residence
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(6)
(7)
Education Residence

-61.57
(55.89)

50–59 Share

206.8
(246.0)

60+ Weighted
Ideology

55.30
(39.79)

60+ Share

117.7
(245.2)

Up to HS
Weighted
Ideology

108.8*
(54.08)

Up to HS
Share

-21.39
(16.82)

Some Col.
Weighted
Ideology

50.54
(47.72)

Some Col.
Share

7.191
(17.83)

Col. Grad
Weighted
Ideology

63.13
(65.11)

Col. Grad
Share

-19.52
(20.70)

Post Grad
Weighted
Ideology

-46.86
(72.16)

Post Grad
Share

-22.60
(19.95)

Urban
Weighted
Ideology

46.30***
(12.79)

Urban Share

-4.229
(4.453)

Suburban
Weighted
Ideology

47.61***
(11.60)
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(6)
(7)
Education Residence

Suburban
Share

-9.001**
(3.919)

Rural
Weighted
Ideology

7.247
(14.64)

Rural Share

7.014
(4.948)

Constant

Observations
R-squared

-5.473

31.48

-0.217

-0.00508

-138.8

1.900

-1.330

(4.239)

(140.8)

(1.617)

(5.649)

(241.0)

(1.511)

(3.119)

50

50

50

50

50

50

46

0.844

0.738

0.790

0.786

0.759

0.693

0.811

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

